Part IV: Across Borders
Opening Moves: Kutch to Kashmir in 1965
If Pakistan has any ideas of annexing any part of our territories by force, she should think afresh. I want to state categorically that force will be met with force and aggression against us will never be allowed to succeed.1Speaking to the Indian nation on All India Radio, 13 August 1965. From Ramachandra Guha’s blog at
– PRIME MINISTER LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI
OPENING MOVES
The post-1962 period saw hectic geopolitical activity in the subcontinent accompanied by political uncertainty in India following the death of its charismatic prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Shell-shocked by what he termed as ‘the Chinese betrayal’ in 1962, and, more importantly, the perceived decline of India’s international standing in the developing world, Nehru’s health declined rapidly all through 1963 till his demise on 27 May 1964. Pakistan on the other hand, ruled as it was by a fading, but ambitious military dictator, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, was making its moves to erode India’s standing in the region and reduce the military and strategic differential that existed between the two countries. Egged on by his young, brilliant and equally ambitious foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Ayub Khan made two defining moves, which suddenly pitchforked Pakistan into the limelight. One of the first anti-India hedging moves by Ayub Khan in 1954, spurred on to a large extent by the anti-India US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was to enter into a direct military pact with the US under the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement. Soon after, it joined the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact, later called CENTO (Central Treaty Organization).2Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 102. The other members of CENTO were Turkey, Iran and the USA. Also see Mohammed Ayub Khan, ‘The Pakistan-American Alliance’, Foreign Affairs (January 1964), available at
The second smart move by Pakistan was in March 1963 when Pakistan entered into a wide-ranging strategic pact with China that centred on marginalizing India’s growing power in the region.4Key features of this treaty were defended by Bhutto in his speech to the UN Security Council on 26 March 1963. See
Notwithstanding concerted attempts by India’s new defence minister, Y.B. Chavan, to rebuild India’s military capability, the political turmoil in India after Nehru’s death and its distinctly weakened and demoralized armed forces emboldened Pakistan’s attempts to push for a military solution to the Kashmir problem. Not making matters easy for India was the falling out of Sheikh Abdullah, the pro-India leader of the National Conference, which swept to power in the first elections in J&K in 1950, and Nehru over the manner in which Kashmiri aspirations were being addressed by India in the mid-1950s. This resulted in the imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah by the Indian government for a number of years on charges of treason.5Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistan Conflicts since 1947 (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1999), p. 51–52. The ensuing deterioration of the law and order situation in J&K was fuelled partly by his continued arrest, and partly by the corruption and poor governance of the state government led by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Sheikh Abdullah’s rival within the National Conference party.6Ibid. In such an environment, one can hardly fault Ayub Khan for the timing of Pakistan’s second attempt in two decades to wrest Kashmir from India. The time was ripe to unfold Operation Gibraltar, as the plan to subvert and seize Kashmir as it entered the chilly spring of 1965 came to be known. Summer saw an increase in the number of infiltrations and ceasefire violations from across the Line of Control and a pattern emerging on the contours of the likely ‘takeover of Kashmir Strategy’ by Pakistan.7Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965 (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991), p. 22.
However, Operation Gibraltar will have to wait a while as we shift focus southwards to the harsh, untamed and beautiful salt pans and marshlands of Kutch. This remote frontier district of the state of Gujarat, which borders the Pakistani province of Sind, was to turn into a battleground in the early months of 1965 and act as a pointer for further conflict between India and Pakistan across a wide front. Little did the endangered flamingos and wild asses8The Rann of Kutch is a desolate and beautiful region with tremendous diversity of flora and fauna. The wild asses of Kutch are an endangered species that roam the salt pans, and so are the flamingos which frequent the riverine waterways of the province. of Kutch realize that their peaceful habitat was going to be shattered by two squabbling and warring nations.
MARSHY IMBROGLIO
The Rann of Kutch is a large peninsula-shaped hybrid-marshland-cum salt pan located in the north-eastern part of Kutch, which gets partially submerged during the few monsoon months. For a major part of the year, however, it remains a marshy area interspersed with hard and dry salt pans and a permanently riverine creek, the Sir Creek, the middle of which marks the current border. Like many poorly defined and demarcated frontier areas in the subcontinent, the Rann of Kutch emerged as a contested area in the mid-1950s. Both India and Pakistan coveted the Rann9For a Pakistani viewpoint on the ownership of the Rann, see Lubna Abid Ali, ‘The Rann of Kutch and Its Aftermath,’ South Asian Studies: A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (July–December 2009): p. 251–52. despite clear evidence being available in pre-Independence records that the Maharaja of Kutch had laid claims to it based on irefutable historical evidence. That the British remained quiet and did not oppose the claim, offered some legitimacy during the 1968 UN Tribunal deliberations, which largely went in favour of India. This, more than anything else, vindicated India’s stand that Pakistan had been the first aggressor in 1965 and was only looking at exploiting cartographical ambiguities to lay claim on what was sovereign Indian territory.10Report of International Arbitral Awards: The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) between India and Pakistan, Vol. XVII (19 February 1968): p. 400–500.
Pakistan’s opening gambit that surprised India was as much a testimony to its operational ingenuity and initiative, as it was to the gross inadequacy of India’s intelligence-gathering ability in Sind. Both the IB, which was mandated to gather external intelligence, and Military Intelligence failed to monitor Pakistan’s troop movements and other military developments like construction of tracks and roads as being anything other than routine. This resulted in a delayed build-up of Indian forces to counter even a brigade-sized thrust by Pakistan. Pakistan on its part moved swiftly and exploited the decisiveness of a military regime which had no bureaucratic and procedural compulsions of putting an operational military plan through various processes before being approved.
Based on an operational appreciation by the Pakistan Army, Ayub decided to test India’s military preparedness in an area which was considerably distant from Kashmir, where plans were finalized to launch Operation Gibraltar later in the year. He decisively moved an entire infantry brigade with armour and artillery to the remote Rann area in early April 1965 to grab some territory before the monsoons set in.11For a detailed description of force levels and a chronological sequence of events, see S.N. Prasad (chief editor) and U.P. Thapliyal (general editor), The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History (Dehradun and Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2011), p. 20–30. This book is an official history of the war, brought out by the Ministry of Defence, Government of India. He would soon boost that force to almost a division as the skirmish flared up.
OPERATION DESERT HAWK
From the manner in which the Pakistan Army had re-equipped and remodelled itself with US assistance for almost a decade prior to the onset of hostilities,12Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1984), p. 64 it was keen to test its equipment on the battlefield against an opponent whose modernization process had just begun. Specifically, along with new equipment, Pakistan had refined its artillery and air force tactics significantly,13Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 102. and speedily wanted to validate in a restricted and limited battle environment. Though Lubna Abid Ali, a Pakistani historian, argues that the military operation was launched by Pakistan to rectify a historical injustice and restore Pakistan’s territorial integrity,14Lubna Abid Ali, ‘The Rann of Kutch and Its Aftermath,’ South Asian Studies: A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (July–December 2009): p. 253–55. the timing of the operation points otherwise. It was a classic probing military operation executed with some skill.
While the strategic objective of Operation Desert Hawk, as Pakistan named this limited operation, was to analyse the politico-military reaction from the new Indian government and the ensuing international reaction to Pakistani military adventurism, the military objectives were pretty focused. From the fairly large force levels that were finally employed – two brigades of the Indian Army against a division including two armoured regiments of the Pakistan Army along with supporting artillery15S.N. Prasad (chief editor) and U.P. Thapliyal (general editor), The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History (Dehradun and Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2011), p. 27–28. – three main military objectives emerge from a Pakistani perspective. The first was an evaluation of India’s military preparedness, the second was an opportunity to test the Patton tank in manoeuvre warfare along with the infantry and with artillery support, and lastly, to grab any territory and hold it.
The provocation for the skirmish has a two-sided explanation. While the Indian Army tentatively moved its posts forward towards a small border hamlet called Kanjarkot to oppose what it believed was Pakistani encroachment into Indian territory north of the 24th Parallel,16‘The Preliminaries: Line-up and the Rann of Kutch,’ [www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1965war/chapter2.html](http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1965war/chapter2.html) (accessed on 14 September 2013). the Pakistani side claimed that their armed action was to evict Indian troops from a new post called Sardar Post.17Lubna Abid Ali, ‘The Rann of Kutch and Its Aftermath,’ South Asian Studies: A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (July–December 2009): p. 252. This, they claimed, was in Pakistani territory as per historical legacies that had seen agreements signed by the Maharaja of Kutch ceding that territory to Sindhi cattle grazers in the nineteenth century. The bottom line was that the legacy of the British leaving poorly demarcated borders in remote areas had created problems for India once again where a ‘show of force’ was resorted to for asserting territorial claims. While the initial setting up of posts by the Indian Army in March 1965 could not be contested by the Indus Rangers (a Pakistani paramilitary force in that region), Pakistan moved swiftly and moved the remainder elements of a whole division (8 Division) under Major General Tikka Khan into the area by 7 April. Tikka Khan was to gain notoriety six years later as the ‘Butcher of East Pakistan’.
Though the Indian Army would ultimately deploy two brigades in the region (31 Brigade and a depleted 50 Para Brigade) and reorganize it as Kilo Force under Major General P.O. Dunne,18Ibid. Also see S.N. Prasad (chief editor) and U.P. Thapliyal (general editor), The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History (Dehradun and Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2011), p. 27. these were undermanned and did not have the mobility and wherewithal to counter the swift initial assault by a brigade-sized force with a squadron of Patton tanks against a company location at Sardar Post.19P.C. Lal, My Years with the IAF (New Delhi: Lancer, 1986), p. 124. The next few days saw isolated but fierce fighting at the battalion level with the Pakistani army faring better in most initial exchanges due to its numerical superiority and employment of armour in the form of the much feared Patton tanks. Realizing that the Indian posts at Sardar Post and Vigokot were effectively mined and well defended, Tikka Khan bypassed them and made a run for the small town of Dharamsala about 30-odd kilometres inside Indian territory.20For a crisp account of the Kutch battle, see K.C. Praval, India’s Paratroopers (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1974), p. 240–48. This forced Dunne to withdraw most of his 31 Brigade to defend Dharamsala. Employment of armour certainly took the Indians by surprise though a terrain analysis, had it been thoroughly done, would have indicated that the terrain on the Pakistan side was favourable for the employment of armour and maintenance of logistics lines as the major town of Badin was barely 30 km from the border. Compared to that the closest Indian town of Bhuj was almost 180 km from the border.21S.N. Prasad (chief editor) and U.P. Thapliyal (general editor), The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History (Dehradun and Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2011), p. 21.
An aerial reconnaissance sortie carried out by a Vampire jet of the IAF operating from Jamnagar confirmed the presence of Patton tanks and caused some consternation in Delhi, leading to a threat from Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Indian prime minister, that should Pakistan not pull back, India would be forced to contemplate widespread and immediate military action. This was something that Pakistan did not want before it had all its forces in place for its main operational plans in J&K. The situation, however, also allowed India to gather adequate international support and pin the tag of aggressor on Pakistan. In fact, on learning that a Vampire had been launched from Jamnagar airbase, the Pakistani air force chief, Air Marshal Asghar Khan is said to have called his counterpart in India, Air Marshal Arjan Singh (both of them were squadron commanders on the same side in the Burma campaign of WW II) and suggested that the two air forces stay out of this skirmish.22P.V.S. Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2009), p. 62. While much has been made of this exchange, it would be naive to imagine that had it not happened, India would have decisively used air power in Kutch given the rather defensive strategic mindset prevailing in Delhi.
The power equations that existed within the Pakistan military would establish that there was not much difference between inter-service relations in India and Pakistan. Just as General J.N. Chaudhuri, India’s army chief, was pretty clear that that he was ‘first among equals’ when it came to the pecking order vis-à-vis his counterparts in the IAF and the Indian Navy, General Musa, the Pakistan Army chief, and Field Marshal Ayub Khan had pretty much the same attitude towards the PAF chief, Air Marshal Asghar Khan. Sajad Haider, one of the PAF’s most illustrious fighter pilots with extensive combat experience in both the 1965 and 1971 wars with India, reckons that they were wary of Asghar’s ‘intrepid and strategic mind’ and did not find it necessary to keep him updated with the plans for Operation Desert Hawk.23In an email exchange between Jagan Mohan and Sajad Haider on 5 March 2015, the PAF veteran shares some illuminating perspectives on the 1965 war. As a result, the closest PAF airbase at Mauripur (close to Karachi) with F-86 Sabres was too far away from the Rann of Kutch to provide meaningful air support. It was just as well because Haider adds that Pakistan thought that the IAF had activated the Bhuj airfield, while the IAF thought that the PAF would use the airfields at Hyderabad (Sind), Nawabshah or Sukkur.24Ibid. Five decades later, it is clear that both air forces were operating in an intelligence vacuum and lost the opportunity to make an impression in Kutch. However, the PAF did leverage the existing conflict situation to hone its air–land operations by ensuring that Sabres from Mauripur flew simulated close air support missions in the 8 Division areas of operations on a daily basis under FAC control as a fighter pilot was attached to the army formation to create some synergy.25John Fricker, Battle for Pakistan (Surrey: Ian Allen Ltd, 1979), p. 42.
Having held its own during the initial exchanges and proved its tactics and equipment, units of the Pakistani army stood their ground as hectic international diplomacy took over to limit the fallout of the skirmishes. From most accounts it appeared that India was in no mood to expand the conflict beyond mere diplomatic sabre-rattling, while Pakistan was under pressure to cease hostilities. Finally, under immense pressure from Harold Wilson, the British prime minister, Pakistan agreed to pull back and agree to a ceasefire and truce with India over the Rann on 6 June 1965.26Lubna Abid Ali, ‘The Rann of Kutch and Its Aftermath,’ South Asian Studies: A Research Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (July–December 2009): p. 254. The salient aspects of the ceasefire agreement included a territorial restoration of status quo on the Gujarat–West Pakistan border as on 1 January 1965, troop withdrawal within seven days and constitution of an international tribunal within two months should the two countries fail to reach a negotiated settlement.27S.N. Prasad (chief editor) and U.P. Thapliyal (general editor), The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History (Dehradun and Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2011), p. 36–37.
A word here about another localized military confrontation during the same time around the icy heights of Kargil in Ladakh is in order as it indicates how India was again at the receiving end during brokered negotiations after a localized conflict. Frustrated at the constant Pakistani shelling of the Srinagar–Leh highway from heights overlooking the town of Kargil, called Pt 13620 and Black Rock, Indian forces captured the heights in mid-May 1965 after a tough assault, only to give them back after the composite ceasefire of June.28P.C. Lal, My Years with the IAF (New Delhi: Lancer, 1986), p. 124–25. Air Chief Marshal P. C. Lal, the IAF’s chief of air staff from 16 July 1969 to 15 January 1973, visited the area in 1972 and narrates the difficulty of combat at those rarefied heights in his memoirs. When he asked one of the officers who had participated in the 1965 assault what his experiences were and what was the most difficult part, the response was:
Thirst! The bare stones are cold at night in these heights, ‘stone cold’. The entire operation had to be done in the cover of darkness. The soldiers would have to be at the required height the previous morning, in the early hours and then lie still under the shadow, or in the shelter, of suitable boulders, hoping and praying not to be detected. Movement and liquid intake had to be minimised. When they reached the top and took it after tough hand-to-hand fighting, they were too exhausted by the time the battle and tension were over to feel any elation or triumph.29Ibid.
Reactions in India and Pakistan after the Kutch skirmish were similar with the general perception in Pakistan being that Ayub Khan had lost a golden opportunity to give India a bloody nose with Tikka Khan’s 8 Division poised for a further advance into the Rann after bypassing most of the Indian border posts. On the Indian side, the opposition led by Atal Behari Vajpayee of the Jana Sangh, a right-wing nationalist party, urged the government to offer a fitting riposte and not accept a truce. The bottom line was that with barely two brigades, hardly any armour, and unwillingness on the part of the government to use air power, the Southern Army Command of the Indian Army was in no position to deliver that riposte. Added to the unpreparedness was the fact that the IAF did not have any meaningful air assets in the region other than those at Jamnagar, which was a training base equipped with Vampire jets and a few other training aircraft.30P.V.S. Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2009), p. 36. A few strikes by IAF fighter aircraft from Jamnagar could have played havoc into Pakistani armour and demonstrated some intent on the part of India. But it was not to be so as Pakistan walked smugly away after validating what it had set out to do prior to commencement of the skirmish. The success of Operation Desert Hawk and the return of heights in Kargil created a false sense of euphoria within Pakistan’s strategic establishment, emboldening it to invigorate the subversion and infiltration campaign in Kashmir, which had commenced in early 1965 even before the winter snows had melted.31Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965 (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991), p. 22.
MILITARY BALANCE
With India rebuilding itself militarily under Prime Minister Shastri and a fairly proactive defence minister Y.B. Chavan, albeit at a slower pace than Pakistan, its defence budget increased significantly from 2.1 per cent of GDP in 1961–62 to 4.0 per cent in 1963–64.32Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 37. According to Sumit Ganguly, 1964–65 provided a strategic ‘window of opportunity’33Ibid., p. 31. for Pakistan to strike before the gap in military capability widened in India’s favour once all its acquisition and expansion plans fructified. Pakistan reckoned that it would not be long before India reached its government-cleared force levels of a one-million-strong army and a forty-five-squadron air force. At the turn of 1965 Sumit Ganguly put the Indian Army at 8,70,000 strong with sixteen infantry divisions. Four additional mountain divisions were in the process of being raised for deployment on the China front. Of these, ten divisions, some of which were undermanned,34S.N. Prasad (chief editor) and U.P. Thapliyal (general editor), The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History (Dehradun and Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2011), p. 13. were ranged against Pakistan, which had all of its seven divisions ranged against India35Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 37. barring a few brigades on its north-west frontier. India’s advantage in armour along its western front was less marked. There was near parity with both sides having an armoured division and approximately three regiments (an armoured brigade equivalent)36While Sumit Ganguly indicates that India had two armoured divisions against Pakistan’s one, a more accurate holding is provided by Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army (New Delhi: Lancer, 1999), p. 67–68. The Pak advantage over India was mainly in the form of an extra armoured brigade with six armoured divisions. ranged against each other with Pakistan having a marginal numerical advantage. More significantly, Pakistan enjoyed a qualitative advantage in armour with the Patton tank said to be superior to the Centurion and Sherman tanks, which equipped India’s armoured divisions.
From 1955 onwards the US supplied Pakistan with military hardware under the Military Assistance Programme (MAP). Included in this were 400 M-48 Patton tanks and 200 M-24 Chaffee tanks. However, the Centurion would go on to acquit itself well against the Patton tank in all the tank battles fought in the 1965 war, particularly in the battle of Khem Karan and Assal Uttar. The Patton tank was believed to have night- fighting capability and other advanced systems. However, it is believed that these were not well exploited by the Pakistani army as the war progressed. The basic infantryman’s weapon in the Indian Army was undergoing a transition with the .303 rifle being replaced by the Belgian-made 7.62 mm self-loading rifle (SLR). Many battalions were still equipped with the .303 when the war broke out. The Pakistan Army on the other hand was completely equipped with the 7.62 mm SLR.
In terms of artillery too the Pakistanis outgunned their Indian opponents. Saddled with WW II vintage equipment like the towed 25 pounder, 3.7" Howitzers, 5.5" and 7.2" guns with a maximum range of 12 to 15 km, the Indian Army would be severely handicapped during artillery engagements. The Pakistan Army on the other hand benefited immensely from the MAP with the acquisition of self-propelled Howitzers (105 mm), jeep-mounted 103 mm recoilless anti-tank guns and heavy artillery (155 mm).37For a detailed tabular comparison of all forces, see S.N. Prasad (chief editor) and U.P. Thapliyal (general editor), The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History (Dehradun and Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2011), p. 9–11. Supported by these guns, which had a maximum range of 25 to 27 km (155 mm), the basic Pak infantry company had widened its effective frontage to 1,000 yards38Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 193. from an earlier 600 to 700 yards. This would prove particularly decisive during the Chhamb offensive operations as the Indian defences were softened prior to the armoured assault, and again during defensive operations against Indian armoured thrusts in the Sialkot and Khem Karan sectors.
In the air too the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) enjoyed a marginal qualitative superiority over the Indian Air Force (IAF) though it was outnumbered by a fair margin. The metamorphosis of the PAF into a lean and potent force with diverse capabilities began in the mid-1950s with the arrival of the F-86 Sabre jets and the Canberra bombers. Learning from the USAF experience in Korea and the initial years of the Vietnam War, PAF pilots picked up the finer nuances of air combat and air–land operations at a time when the IAF was in the midst of a wide-ranging expansion itself. The main difference being that the PAF benefited from putting all its eggs in the US basket, while India looked to Russia (MiG-21s), UK (Hunters, Gnats, Canberras) and France (Mysteres) for its expansion. Consequently, there was fair standardization of technology, tactics and procedures in the PAF as against an absence of the same in the IAF. Acquired in 1960 from the US under the MAP were 12 F-104 Starfighter supersonic interceptors armed with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and a six-barrelled 20 mm Vulcan cannon. Though only one squadron (9 Squadron PAF) was formed with fourteen aircraft, it proved to be quite a deterrent and was believed to be far superior to both the MiG-21 and Gnat air defence fighters of the IAF. The mainstay of the PAF, however, was the F-86 Sabre jet, a multi-role fighter, which was as effective in ground attack missions as it was in providing top cover as an air defence platform when armed with Sidewinders. Over 120 of them were procured from the US under the MAP, of which twenty-four were equipped with Sidewinders before hostilities erupted in 1965.39P.V.S. Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2009), p. 55. The C-130 Hercules was a superb medium-lift transport aircraft which was used for special forces’ operations – the stealthy manner in which almost 200 paratroopers were dropped around three Indian airbases without any attrition caused to any of the aircraft used in the mission is testimony to its capability. Ironically, the IAF would go on to buy an advanced version of the same aircraft nearly forty-five years later.
Though the earliest description of the air battle between the PAF and IAF in the 1965 war titled Battle for Pakistan was written by John Fricker in 1979, it was ridiculously biased in favour of the PAF. Nearly twenty-six years later, two enthusiastic Indian aviation enthusiasts, P.V.S. Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, went on to write a highly readable and objective narrative of the air war, The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965. I have chosen to rely on this book to get a realistic view of the numbers on either side. The IAF had a total of 460 combat aircraft including eight squadrons (132 aircraft) of old and slow Vampire trainer-cum-close air support jets, acquired in 1948, and three squadrons (56 aircraft) of Ouragans of similar vintage, acquired from France in the early 1950s. This meant that the IAF had only about 270 combat-worthy aircraft. The workhorse of the ground attack fleet were the eighty-odd Mystere jets, while the sleek and manoeuvrable Hunter jet doubled up as a multi-role aircraft assisting the Gnats in air defence missions.40Ibid., Appendix G, p. 358–359. Though the IAF had inducted the first squadron of MiG-21s into 28 Squadron in mid-1963 after almost a year of hectic negotiations with the Soviet Union, the numbers available were too few to make any significant impact on its operational capability as war clouds loomed on the horizon.
The versatile Canberra was the only bomber aircraft operated by both IAF and PAF. It would come into its own during the various night raids conducted by both sides when day attrition climbed during the initial days of the war. While the IAF had approximately sixty of these aircraft with one squadron exclusively configured for the reconnaissance role, PAF had thirty-two aircraft of the modified US version.41This version had a fighter-style tandem cockpit as against the British version with India which had the navigator lying on his belly in the nose. The US version had ejection seats for both the pilot and the navigator, while only the pilot had an ejection facility in the IAF Canberra; the navigator had to bail out. This numerical superiority was to play an important role during the war as IAF Canberras carried out many deep-night strikes as the war progressed and caused a fair amount of disruption. Thus if you look at an objective force comparison between the IAF and PAF, one arrives at approximately 270 combat-worthy IAF aircraft against about 170 PAF combat aircraft. Air Vice Marshal Tiwary offers another perspective by indicating that the IAF had a large deployment of squadrons on the eastern front leaving it with only around 290 aircraft in the west against his researched strength of Pakistani aircraft of 203.42Air Vice Marshal A.K. Tiwary, Indian Air Force in Wars (New Delhi: Lancer, 2012), table at p. 119. This resulted in a ratio of 1.5:1 in favour of the IAF. Though Prasad and Thapliyal, two official historians from the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, have quoted the Marshal of the Air Force, Arjan Singh, the Chief of Air Staff at the time, as mentioning that the IAF was in awe of the PAF, interviews with other veterans of the conflict reveal no such fear or admiration beyond a realization that the Sabre and Starfighter would be formidable adversaries.43Interview with Air Marshal Patney, 2 June 2013. Air Marshal Pingale and Air Marshal Ghandhi would confirm to the author in numerous conversations that there was no such feeling in IAF squadrons. A few young Indian pilots like Flying Officers McMahon, Rajkumar and Bhatia (all retired as Air Marshals) had flown the Sabre jet in the US and brought back some valuable inputs regarding US tactics and training patterns as a large number of Pakistani pilots had been trained in the US. However, there were no institutional initiatives to brainstorm or evolve central fighter and bomber tactics against the existing PAF capabilities. This was to prove ominous in some of the aerial battles in the months ahead.44The fact was confirmed in a telephonic conversation with Wing Commander Mayadev, who as a flying officer accompanied McMahon and Bhatia to train on Sabres in the US. He recalls that in a briefing in 9 Squadron (Gnats) prior to the sortie in which he was shot down, Mayadev had queried the formation leader on what they should do if the Sabres ‘split’. When there was no clarity, he decided to stick with his leader even when he saw the Sabres in front split, with one of them then manoeuvring offensively to shoot down Mayadev. However, as the war progressed, the IAF evolved effective tactics at the squadron level to counter both the Sabre and the Starfighter.
If there was a force multiplier for the PAF during its period of transition, it was in the form of its longest-serving chief (1957–65), Air Marshal Asghar Khan. Asghar Khan was a visionary airman who had cut his teeth exactly in a similar manner as many of the IAF’s stalwarts like Mehar Singh and Arjan Singh had in the cauldron of WW II. His understanding of air power and willingness to push for an important role for the PAF in joint operations paid rich dividends. He initially had the ear of Field Marshal Ayub Khan and ensured that whatever he asked for the PAF in terms of budgetary support and creation of forward bases as a means of blunting India’s numerical superiority was agreed to. The setting up of an aerobatic team and the Fighter Leaders’ School in 1958,45‘Mitty Masud Folds His Wings,’ at
Though the two navies were not to see much action on the western seaboard of the subcontinent, the Indian Navy had its aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, undergoing a refit and thereby lost its decisive edge over the Pakistani navy, though quantitatively it had almost three times the number of warships with the INS Mysore packing a mighty punch with its huge guns. The absence of the Vikrant and the unwillingness of the government to escalate the conflict remained the main reasons why the Indian Navy did not prosecute any major offensive operation during the 1965 conflict. Though the Sea Hawk fighters on the aircraft carrier were available for offensive strikes, integrating them into the IAF plan proved to be a problem area. The presence of a Tench Class submarine with the Pakistan Navy, the PNS Ghazi, did not deter the Indian Navy, as it periodically did carry out anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises with British submarines on the east coast.
SUBVERSION IN J&K
The inability of Pakistan to sever J&K from the Indian Union in 1948 had turned into a national obsession for Pakistan and its armed forces. It had also become a focal point in the development of an India-centric national security strategy and a rallying point for Islamists in their jihad against India. Having grabbed large chunks of territory in J&K from India in 1948 in what was an audacious plan, particularly the one which succeeded in capturing the Northern Area, Gilgit and Skardu, it was only natural that Pakistan would look for an opportune moment to occupy the rest of the state and fulfil the dreams of its founding fathers. Audacious military plans are generally the work of a small core group of strategists and soldiers. Just as Akbar Khan was the architect of the 1947–48 infiltration with tacit support from Jinnah, Operation Gibraltar, the 1965 plan for subversion, infiltration and occupation was supported and inspired by Bhutto.46Farzana Sheikh, ‘Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: In Pursuit of an Asian Pakistan,’ in Ramachandra Guha, ed., Makers of Modern Asia (Cambridge: The Belknapp Press, 2014), p. 281. It was then operationally stitched together by Major General Akhtar Hussein Malik, the General Officer Commanding of Pakistan’s 12 Division. Air Marshal Asghar Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, describes Malik as a ‘bold and imaginative officer’.47M. Asghar Khan, The First Round Indo-Pakistan War 1965 (Ghaziabad: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), p. 75. He was also the architect of Operation Grand Slam, the swift armoured thrust into the Chhamb and Akhnur districts of Jammu that was aimed at isolating J&K from the rest of India and thereby completing the plan to ‘sandwich’ J&K48Major General Lachhman Singh, Missed Opportunities: Indo-Pak War 1965 (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 1997), p. 117, 155. For a detailed analysis of the role played by Akhtar Malik in Operation Gibraltar and Operation Grand Slam, see S.N. Prasad (chief editor) and U.P. Thapliyal (general editor), The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History (Dehradun and Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2011), p. 51–55, 123–24. and amalgamate it into Pakistan.
Operation Gibraltar was crafted with certain geopolitical and military assumptions, many of which would later emerge as untenable and overambitious. History has repeatedly demonstrated that the only way in which a numerically inferior force or a smaller nation can defeat a more powerful adversary is by surprising the enemy in time and space with speed and sustained offensive action. Added to this, if the local population where this military action is proposed can be subverted, the attacker has the right recipe for a high probability of success. While the geopolitical conditions have been brought out earlier in the chapter, what were the operational conditions which allowed an experienced soldier-turned-president, Ayub Khan, to finally give the green signal to launch this military adventure against India in 1965?
First, the success of Operation Desert Hawk convinced Ayub Khan of the tactical, operational and technological superiority of the Pakistan Army. With Air Chief Marshal Asghar Khan assuring the president before handing over command of the PAF to Air Marshal Nur Khan that the Pakistan Air Force with its recently acquired F-86 and F-104 Starfighter jets was far superior to the IAF, Ayub Khan could hedge his bets should India decide to counter Operation Gibraltar with a riposte in Punjab. Second, the intelligence from J&K indicated that the local population was restive and highly vulnerable to subversion, and when the time came, would rise in rebellion and fight against the Indian Army alongside the mujahids and regulars of the Pakistan Army. Lastly, though Major General Malik appreciated that the Indian Army would be better prepared to counter the infiltration campaign as compared to 1947, he was confident that his own mujahid battalions would be better trained and equipped than the ragtag force which assaulted the Kashmir Valley back in 1947. When coupled with the prevailing geopolitical instability in India resulting from Nehru’s untimely death, the relatively stable military regime in Pakistan felt that it was an ideal time to strike in Kashmir.