The Indian Navy

Early History

India's maritime legacy can be traced back to the Indus Valley Civilization where signs of maritime trade linkages with other civilizations have been found at excavation sites at Harappa.3Ibid. While clear signs of India's sea-bound forays into the Arabian Sea and towards South-East Asia emerged from the southern parts of the country in the first century AD,4'Indian Navy, A Historical Overview', available at www.bharat-rakshak.com (accessed 15 April 2013). any serious maritime expansion and conquest commenced only with the mighty Chola Empire, under its dynamic kings Rajaraja I and Rajendra I.5Also see Bisheshwar Prasad, ed., The Royal Indian Navy (Agra: Agra University Press, 1964), p. 1–3. Between the later part of the tenth century AD and the beginning of the twelfth century AD, these rulers of the mighty Chola Empire extended their influence to Sri Lanka, Maldives and most parts of South-East Asia. This was done by a combination of maritime conquest, trade and cultural links, what could well be termed in modern parlance as a combination of hard and soft power. It is because of this holistic application of maritime power that Indian influence is still prevalent in many parts of South-East Asia in the garb of art forms and archeological monuments that have a distinct south Indian flavour. Indian sea power declined after the thirteenth century with the arrival of Muslim invaders from the north and was completely eclipsed by European sea power in the late sixteenth century with the arrival on the Kerala coast of the Portuguese led by Vasco da Gama.6Ibid., p. 3. Some spirited resistance though was offered by the Zamorin (Hindu rulers) of Calicut for well over ninety years in the sixteenth century.7Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 1945–50 (New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing, 1986), p. 9.

The Zamorin of Malabar ruled over a multi-religious population comprising Muslim seafaring people and Hindus around the Malabar Coast. Located in what is today large portions of the northern and central Kerala coast, their empire extended from about 60 km north of the town of Calicut (Kozhikode today), to the port of Quilon, almost 350 km to the south. The Kunjali Marakkars were a seafaring warrior clan who sailed along the Malabar Coast and commanded the Zamorin's naval fleet at a time when the Portuguese showed great interest in establishing a foothold there. Repeatedly fighting off Portuguese raids through the sixteenth century, the Marakkars can rightfully claim to have been the first organized naval defence force in late medieval India. Their resistance was finally broken down when their own rulers conspired with the Portuguese to defeat Kunhali Marrakar in a combined sea–land battle in 1604.8Rajiv Theodore, 'India's First Naval Heroes – Unsung and Unwept – Kunjali Marakkars,' available at www.americanbazaar.com/2014/09/11/India's-first-naval-heroes-unsung-unwept-kunjali-marakkars/ (accessed 12 September 2014). For a detailed history of the Zamorins also see K.V. Krishna Aiyyar, The Zamorins of Calicut (Calicut: Norman Printing Bureau, 1938). The book was referred to from a digital library collection at calicutheritage.com/Digital_Library.aspx (accessed on 12 September 2014).

Maratha Resurgence at Sea

As one drives along the west coast from Gujarat down to Kerala, it is impossible not to notice the number of coastal fortifications along the way. What is also clearly evident is that the number of fortifications on the Maharashtra and Konkan coast far outnumber those along the Gujarat, Karnataka and Kerala coasts. Some of these like Devgarh and Alibaug are typically Maratha in architecture and design, while others like Murud and Janjira have distinct Mughal features. The Maratha opposition to both the Mughal and British Empires was led by the Maratha warrior and guerilla king Shivaji, who not only developed a strong army but also had the vision to build a navy. It is remarkable that he visualized the imminent decline of Mughal power and the possibilities of his empire being threatened by European colonialists from the sea and kept track of Portuguese and Dutch forays on the west coast. With a keen eye for picking the right kind of leaders to support his vision of a pan-Indian Maratha Empire in the second half of the seventeenth century, he chose Tukoji Angre as his Sarkhel (Admiral in the Marathi language) and protect the seas on the Maratha coast (west coast of India) from predatory European fleets.

With his doctrine resting on a sound precept of Jalamaiva yasya, balamaiva tasya (whoever is powerful on sea is all-powerful),9Ibid. Tukoji built a fleet of 200 ships and after Shivaji's death in 1697 chose to be an independent satrap with allegiance to the Maratha empire. Tukoji's son, Kanhoji, followed in his father's footsteps and even after Shivaji's death, dominated the seas around Maharashtra and Konkan from a fortress at Alibaug, a few hours south of what is today Mumbai. Kanhoji established his maritime prowess in early seventeenth century by defeating a strong Arab pirate fleet operating out of Muscat, which was looting merchant ships bound for the Konkan coast.10Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 1945–50 (New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing, 1986), p. 13. For almost thirty years till his death in 1729, Kanhoji built a powerful 300-ship flotilla with significant firepower and conducted numerous raids against Portuguese and British ships, interdicting merchant ships and men-of-war as they sailed from Surat on the Gujarat coast to Calicut on the Kerala coast. In 1721, he defeated a joint attempt by the Portuguese and the British to breach his fortress at Alibaug.11'Kanhoji Angre', available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kanhoji_Angre (accessed 10 May 2013). Like Tipu Sultan and Maharaja Ranjit Singh, Kanhoji Angre also employed Frenchmen to teach his sailors aspects of modern seamanship and firepower drills, all of which paid rich dividends in ensuring that the British East India Company remained unsuccessful in its attempts to dominate India's west coast for a long time.

Unfortunately, like in so many instances in the history of British colonial expansion in India, they managed to divide the opposition by allying with one faction to first defeat the stronger element, and then progressively fragmenting the remainder of the opposition. In this case, after the death of Kanhoji Angre in 1729, the British bided their time and allied with the Peshwa rulers of Pune to defeat Kanhoji Angre's son, Tulaji, at Vijaydurg in 1756. Thus ended the last vestiges of maritime resistance to British colonial expansion. Kanhoji Angre's legacy is well preserved at Alibaug and free India's first establishment in Bombay, the Western Naval Command's headquarters, was called INS Angre in honour of India's own Maratha admiral of the western seas. Although modern Indian fiction writers largely ignored war as a theme, Manohar Malgaonkar, a retired lieutenant colonel from the Maratha Light Infantry and a popular writer in the 1960s and 1970s, did write an eminently readable biography on the life and times of Kanhoji Angre titled Sea Hawk.

British Legacy

Although the first fleet for the protection of the East India Company's trade routes from pirates and Maratha sea power was set up at Surat in 1612, the real expression of British maritime might in the subcontinent was the Bombay Marine. After defeating the remnants of Maratha, French, Dutch and Portuguese sea power, the Bombay Marine set about dominating the west coast of India from Gujarat in the north to Calicut in the south. After nearly 150 years of unchallenged existence, the Bombay Marine was renamed the Indian Navy in 1830, Her Majesty's Indian Navy in 1858, Her Majesty's Indian Marine in 1877, Royal Indian Marine in 1877 and finally, the Royal Indian Navy in 1934.12'The Genesis of the Indian Navy,' available at www.bharat-rakshak.com/History/Maritime-Heritage/28-Genesis.html?tmpl=co. (accessed 8 April 2013). These frequent changes reflected the constant tussle between various stakeholders of British colonial leadership for control of the primary means of transportation for the British from their homeland to their colonies. This, in turn, also controlled the distribution of wealth amongst the various beneficiaries including the Crown, the royalty and hundreds of merchants. Compared to the British Indian Army, which depended on Indian soldiers to do the bulk of their war fighting, the Royal Marine mainly had a complement of British sailors and officers.

While the officers were drawn from the Royal Navy and the East India Company, the sailors comprised mercenaries, employees of the Company and convicts working for their freedom. Records from a few towns along the Konkan coast of Maharashtra indicate that once the Marathas had been defeated at sea, the East India Company started recruiting locals and employed them on ships that sailed only along the coast of India, and not on any long voyages to England. These Konkani sailors can rightfully claim to be the first Indian sailors of the Royal Navy. After the First War of Independence in 1857, a complement of the Royal Marine was positioned at Calcutta and formed the eastern wing of the Royal Indian Marine (RIM). By the end of the nineteenth century, it had fifty ships on its inventory.

The Choppy Waters of WW I

Though the Indian Army bore the brunt of the horrors of WW I, and some Indian pilots did blaze a trail of glory across the skies of France, the RIM also contributed to the war effort in its own small way.13Bisheshwar Prasad, ed., The Royal Indian Navy (Agra: Agra University Press, 1964), p. 6. The main roles of the RIM were minesweeping, patrolling the waters of Iraq, Egypt and East Africa and ferrying troops and war supplies to the same region. The relative global mastery of the Royal Navy ensured that the Royal Indian Marine hardly suffered any attrition and did not get involved in any significant naval battles during the war. The severe limitations of the Royal Indian Marine came to the fore in the abortive Mesopotamian campaign of 1915–16, where the British were defeated at Kut14James Goldrick, No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945–1996 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1997), p. 3. with the Royal Marine unable to either support the campaign with adequate troop inductions or firepower.

The aftermath of the war brought with it the miseries of downsizing, retrenchment and widespread unemployment in the villages of the Konkan coast as the Royal Indian Marine was designated a non-combatant service with only survey and patrolling tasks.15Bisheshwar Prasad, ed., The Royal Indian Navy (Agra: Agra University Press, 1964), p. 6. In response to widespread protests from leaders of India's independence movement and efforts by Lord Jellicoe, the admiral of the fleet, to realistically assess the naval defence requirements of the Indian empire, the Royal Indian Marine was once again designated as a combatant service in 1925.16James Goldrick, No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945–1996 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1997), p. 4. Local recruitment was resumed and Sub-Lieutenant D.N. Mukherji joined as the first Indian officer in the engineering branch.17Bisheshwar Prasad, ed., The Royal Indian Navy (Agra: Agra University Press, 1964), p. 8. Also see James Goldrick, No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945–1996 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1997), p. 5.

Growing Up

The inter-war years were interesting ones for the Royal Indian Marine as it attempted to keep pace with the growth of the Indian Army; its growth was similar to that of the Indian Air Force with its niggardly complement of barely two flights of Wapiti aircraft (also called 'What a Pity' by knowledgeable aviators of the time). Despite the attempts by Lord Jellicoe and Lord Rawlinson, minister of defence in the Indian government,18Ibid. to amalgamate the RIM into the Royal Navy in the 1920s, it would take almost a decade more to achieve. The simple fact was that the British were supreme at sea and without even the remotest possibilities of any threat emerging to their trade routes between India and Great Britain. All that was to change by the mid-1930s when Nazi Germany embarked on a massive naval modernization. Though the focus of attention was on the Atlantic and North Sea fleets, some attention was now paid to the Royal Indian Marine. It was rechristened the Royal Indian Navy in 1934 and inaugurated with its headquarters at Bombay under a Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy (FOCRIN).19Ibid., p. 8.

A look at the maritime situation at the time will clearly reveal the reasons for continued neglect of the Royal Indian Navy even while there was significant German and Japanese naval build-up. The British appreciated that the main threats to their naval supremacy from Germany and Japan would emerge in the Atlantic and the Pacific respectively. To counter this they went about strengthening their fleet in Singapore and shoring up their Atlantic fleet. It was felt that the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal were well beyond the ranges of either the German or the Japanese fleet; hence the need for convoys between Britain and India and India and China to be protected came up only when they rounded the Cape of Good Hope, or passed by the Strait of Malacca. This, the British felt, would be taken on by the Atlantic and Pacific fleets – no need was thus felt to significantly beef up the Royal Indian Navy beyond converting a few merchant ships to men-of-war as minesweepers and armed escorts. The Royal Indian Navy was all of eight warships20'The Genesis of the Indian Navy,' available at www.bharat-rakshak.com/History/Maritime-Heritage/28-Genesis.html?tmpl=co. (accessed 8 April 2013). and 1,300 personnel at the outbreak of WW II. Its headquarters at Bombay comprised a Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy (FOCRIN) of the rank of a rear admiral and around fifteen officers.21Bisheshwar Prasad, ed., The Royal Indian Navy (Agra: Agra University Press, 1964), Appendix II, 'Composition of Naval Headquarters at Bombay as of 1941.' Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh has put the figure at 114 officers, 1,732 ratings and sixteen officers manning the Naval HQ at Bombay. Little did it realize that the turn of events over the next few years, dictated largely by massive defeats for Britain in Singapore and Malaya, would result in a speedy build-up of the Royal Indian Navy as all attempts were made by the Crown to ensure that its colonies supported the war effort.

A Professional Service Emerges: WW II

As the Royal Navy built its Atlantic and Pacific fleets around large battleships and cruisers like the HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales, the Royal Indian Navy's (RIN) force structure was limited to one that revolved around a fleet of minesweeper torpedo boats and landing craft.22James Goldrick, No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945–1996 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1997), p. 5–7. As the war progressed, its role expanded from protection of trade routes around India and coastal defence, to supporting the land campaign by providing landing craft for seaborne assault and induction of troops in the Persian Gulf and the Arakan Coast during the Burma offensive in 1944–45.23Bisheshwar Prasad, ed., The Royal Indian Navy (Agra: Agra University Press, 1964), p. 36. Amongst the significant operations conducted by the RIN was the fighting against the Italian Navy off the coast of Somaliland, assisting in the evacuation of Allied forces in 1940 and helping in the subsequent recapture of Massawa in 1941 following the Allied offensive from the north.24http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_Flotilla (accessed 6 June 2013). The two major gallantry awards won by the RIN during action in the Persian Gulf – both Distinguished Service Crosses – were awarded to Lieutenant N. Krishnan and Engineer Lieutenant D. Shankar for their bravery during action on ships that were on their way to join the RIN in the Persian Gulf.25Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 1945–50 (New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing, 1986), p. 25.

Second-in-command of a small tug as part of an assault landing operation off the Iranian coast in August 1941, Krishnan boarded an enemy tug that was firing indiscriminately at Allied landing craft and disabled the firing party single-handedly before the rest of his team boarded the tug to capture it.26Bisheshwar Prasad, ed., The Royal Indian Navy (Agra: Agra University Press, 1964), p. 86. Lieutenant Shankar boarded a blazing Italian warship to capture the crew at considerable risk to his life.27Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 1945–50 (New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing, 1986), p. 25. RIN ships also carried out regular escort duties to large convoys as they sailed through the U-boat-infested waters of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. This report from Lieutenant G.R.W.F. Horner, the commanding officer of HMIS Kumaon, was filed after multiple depth charges were dropped against a German U-boat that was shadowing convoy MKS 9 in the Mediterranean on 13 March 1945. The report not only reflected an analysis of the operation, but also the integrity of conservative assessment of damage to the submarine:

The war in Asia, particularly during the dark days preceding the fall of Singapore in February 1942, was marked by repeated attacks on the RIN by aircraft-carrier-based Japanese dive bombers as they attacked convoys sailing from the Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia) to the fortress of Singapore.29Bisheshwar Prasad, ed., The Royal Indian Navy (Agra: Agra University Press, 1964), p. 95. As the Japanese juggernaut steamed into the Indian Ocean, the RIN could do little to prevent the fall of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in June 1942 and prevent raids by Japanese submarines along the Malabar Coast of western India. Numerous ships of the RIN were sunk by Japanese submarines and the losses galvanized the speedy re-equipping of the RIN with large-scale recruitment taking place during the 1942–44 period.

Action in the Atlantic and Burma

Seeing the hammering that the RIN was taking at the hands of the Japanese, the Royal Navy commissioned a number of warships for the RIN. Amongst them were six anti-aircraft sloops and two minesweepers, all of which were initially deployed with the Atlantic fleet and then progressively transferred to the Mediterranean and Cape fleets as they made their way to India. Along the way some of these ships participated in the Allied landings at Sicily in July 1943 before joining what was called the ML (Motor Launched) Flotillas as part of the coastal forces in the Burma theatre.30Bisheshwar Prasad, ed., The Royal Indian Navy (Agra: Agra University Press, 1964), p. 255. These flotillas initially comprised coastal defence craft such as motor launches, submarine chasers, motor gunboats and motor torpedo boats.31http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coastal_Forces_of_the_Royal_Navy, also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coastal_Forces_of_the_Royal_New_Zealand_Navy (accessed 14 May 2013). These were later supplemented with anti-aircraft sloops and minesweepers as the war progressed.

During 1943–45 the RIN took part in continuous operations along the Arakan Coast of Burma carrying out anti-shipping sweeps, small raids on enemy shipping and installations with commandoes and infantry on board and offensive bombardment. It was on one of these raids that Lieutenant S. M. Ahsan was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.32Bisheshwar Prasad, ed., The Royal Indian Navy (Agra: Agra University Press, 1964), p. 256. He later rose to become the fourth chief of naval staff of the Pakistan Navy. Equipped only with light anti-aircraft guns, ships of the RIN were extremely vulnerable to Japanese Zero fighters and flying boats, and their crew did a magnificent job by successfully engaging such aircraft with machine guns, and even shooting down quite a few of them.

As the tide turned in Burma and Slim's 14th Army pushed the Japanese out of India, numerous operations were conducted by RIN landing craft as they attempted to cut off the retreating Japanese as they made their way northwards through Burma into Malaya. The assault on Akyab in December 1944 was a classic joint battle with elements of the Indian Army (74th and 53rd Indian Brigades), the Indian Air Force and the Royal Indian Navy taking part in the operation. The icing on the cake for the RIN was the capture of Rangoon in May 1945. Code-named Operation Dracula, the operation involved a huge flotilla, which set sail on 16 April 1945 from Mandapam in Tamil Nadu and after a brief halt at Colombo made its way northwards across the choppy Bay of Bengal during what is considered the beginning of the pre-monsoon season. Joining an enormous landing force at Akyab with a large number of assault craft and other small craft amounting to over thirty ships, this was the largest display of force by the fledgling RIN during the Burma campaign.33Ibid., p. 311–15. As the assault force sailed up the Rangoon river with Jat, Garhwali and Punjabi soldiers, one can't help reflecting: if the Indian Army, Indian Air Force and the Royal Indian Navy had not participated in strength in the Burma campaign, would the war in Burma have ended as it did? Surprisingly, the role of the Royal Indian Navy hardly finds a mention in Field Marshal Slim's book Defeat Into Victory except in a few places. So much for jointness in those difficult times. However, Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison, general officer commanding, XV Indian Corps, had this to say about the RIN after the fall of Rangoon:

The Arakan Campaign is now virtually over. The work of all officers and ratings of the R.I.N has maintained its high standards and the spirit of cooperation and comradeship has been maintained in the face of all difficulties. The operations in which we have recently been engaged in narrow chaungs (channels) lined by mangrove swamps and often overlooked by Jap held hills, with swift currents and large rise and fall of tides has called for great skill, seamanship and courage. These qualities have enabled us to carry out operations never before attempted by any British forces. I am extremely grateful to all of them for what they have done, and all ranks of XV Indian Corps are very proud of their comrades. We will remember fighting besides them.34Ibid., p. 313–314.

Just as the Indian Army expanded exponentially during the war, so did the Royal Indian Navy. By the end of the war it had over 25,000 personnel35James Goldrick, No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945–1996 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1997), p. 6. including over 100 Indian and Anglo-Indian officers36Bisheshwar Prasad, ed., The Royal Indian Navy (Agra: Agra University Press, 1964), p. 360–65., with a few from the RINVR (Royal Indian Naval Volunteer Reserve). The senior-most Indian officer was Lieutenant Commander D.N. Mukherji, who later rose to the rank of captain and retired in 1950. It had on its inventory seven sloops, four frigates, four corvettes, fourteen minesweepers, sixteen trawlers, two depot ships, thirty auxiliary vessels, 150 landing craft, 200 harbour craft and several motor launches.37Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 1945–50 (New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing, 1986), p. 28. While the officers of the Royal Indian Navy did not experience the big naval battles of the Atlantic or the Pacific, nor did they participate in epic naval encounters like in the Coral Sea or the Midway, they came away from WW II with sufficient battle experience. However, from the rank structure of Indian officers at the end of WW II, it was quite clear that it would be some time before Indians would be ready to assume leadership of the Indian Navy.

Run-Up to Independence

Just as Field Marshal Auchinleck was committed to leaving a fine British legacy with the Indian Army with his singular understanding of the aspirations of a battle-hardened Indian Army, Admiral John Godfrey, FOCRIN from 1943 to 1946, pushed for the establishment of an independent navy and recommended sweeping changes to the force structure of the RIN despite stiff resistance from the British Chiefs of Staff Committee.38James Goldrick, No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945–1996 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1997), p. 7.

The principal task for the post-war RIN as per the committee that was constituted to look at planning requirements for India's armed forces bears a striking resemblance to the vision and mission statement of today's Indian Navy and reflects the collective maritime wisdom of Great Britain, arguably the greatest sea power the world had ever seen till the emergence of the United States in the post-WW II era. It read:

The principal responsibility of India's Navy after the war will be the safety of Indian and Empire shipping in the ports of India and their approaches. India will also take her share in the protection of this shipping on the trade routes within the Indian Ocean. It will be an important task of India's Navy to provide facilities for the combined operational training of the Army formations maintained in the country and to provide a share of the escorts, assault shipping and craft required to land these troops on a hostile shore, should this prove necessary. In addition, the Navy, in conjunction with the air force must be prepared to take its share in intercepting and attacking any foreign invading force which may attempt a landing on the shores of India.39Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 1945–50 (New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing, 1986), p. 32.

Prophetic words indeed as almost all of the Indian Navy's current roles – sea denial, protection of sea lines of communications (SLOCs), out of area contingency operations and maritime air operations with navy–air force synergy – are part of the current lexicon of naval operations.

The Royal Indian Navy Revolt

Staying with post-war happenings, widespread retrenchment and downsizing of the RIN during the post-war years saw a breakdown in junior leadership and erosion of the camaraderie and fighting spirit that had evolved during WW II. An arbitrary decision to reduce the number of sailors from 27,650 to 11,00040Vice Admiral Mihir Roy, War in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1995), p. 46. caused great angst. Added to this was the exposure of the Indian sailors and officers stationed at Bombay, Karachi, Madras and Calcutta to the growing influence of the independence movement. All this and more resulted in the naval revolt of 1946.41Bishwanath Bose, RIN Mutiny, 1946: Reference and Guide for All (New Delhi, Northern Book Centre, 1988). The Royal Indian Navy revolt, as the leaders of India's independence called it, started on 18 February 1946, when 1,100 naval ratings of a shore-based signals training establishment, HMIS Talwar, struck work at Bombay at dawn. The catalyst for the simmering discontent in the training school was attributed to the persistent derogatory behaviour of the commanding officer.42Narendra Singh Sarila, The Shadow of the Great Game (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2009), p. 172. At Karachi the HMIS Hindustan along with one more ship and three shore establishments, went on a lightning strike protesting against low pay and poor living conditions. There was even a short firefight between the Hindustan and shore-based guns. The strikes spread like wildfire to military establishments in Madras, Vishakhapatnam, Calcutta, Delhi, Cochin, Jamnagar, the Andamans, Bahrain and Aden. Seventy-eight naval ships and twenty shore naval establishments, involving 20,000 navy ratings, were affected.43http://ajitvadakayil.blogspot.in/2013/02/the-indian-navy-mutiny-of-1946-only-war.html (accessed 15 May 2013). Though the naval revolt was speedily put down and did not result in too many casualties – among the mutineers, one rating was killed and six wounded; one RIN officer was killed and one wounded; two British other ranks were wounded in Bombay and eight ratings were killed and thirty-three were wounded including British soldiers44Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 1945–50 (New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing, 1986), p. 54. – it later inspired stray incidents of violence and protest in the Indian Army and Royal Indian Air Force in 1946. Interestingly, it was Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, one of the tall leaders of the Congress party and independent India's first home minister, who is said to have advised the agitating seamen to return to work and leave the protests to the civilians who were at the forefront of the non-violent freedom struggle. He explained to the agitating seamen a simple principle that endured after independence – politics and agitation was the prerogative of politicians. Soldiers, sailors and airmen obeyed.45Brigadier R.R. Palsokar (retd), 'Whom We Serve,' extracts from a prize-winning essay submitted in 2013 to Defence Watch, a monthly journal of defence and security affairs published out of Dehradun.

In May 1946, three armymen of the Royal Indian Army Supply Corps went on trial in Colaba, Mumbai, for refusing to obey orders.46Bombay Chronicle, 29 May 1946, p. 1. In an insightful deposition to an RIN inquiry commission on 29 May 1946, Commander A.W. Gush, officer commanding, RIN base, Karachi, listed out the main reasons for the revolt as being poor recruitment and promotion policies for Indian ratings and lack of big ships that prevented the enforcement of standard disciplinary procedures as men were scattered in small ships with poor living conditions.47Bombay Chronicle, 30 May 1946, p. 5. This only added to the growing scepticism amongst British military leaders that it was about time to leave India! From an independence movement perspective, the revolters had struck a telling blow – for many they were freedom fighters and not mutineers. The revolt was also an attempt by disillusioned naval personnel to emulate the exploits of the INA. In a passionate speech at Bombay on 26 February 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru put the RIN revolt in correct perspective:

The Indian soldier of today is different from the Indian soldier of the last war. He has seen many theatres of war and his contact with soldiers of free countries has opened his eyes to the forces of freedom operating in other countries. The present unrest among the defence services has a direct bearing on the Indian body politic.48S. Gopal, ed., Speech at Bombay – 26 February 1946, The Hindu, 27 February 1946, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 15 (New Delhi: Orient Longman), p. 22–25.

This contribution of the striking sailors to the independence movement was recognized by the Government of India in 1972 and all 476 sailors who were penalized in various ways after the revolt were eligible for the grant of a freedom fighter's pension.49Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 1945–50 (New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing, 1986), p. 90.

Flying the Indian Ensign

No one typifies the doughty post-Independence Indian naval officer better than Admiral Jayant Nadkarni, chief of naval staff from 1987 to 1990. Leaving home at the tender age of fourteen to join the merchant navy in 1946, young Nadkarni joined the training ship Dufferin to begin a nearly five-decade-long association with the Indian seas. Witness to the RIN revolt, he recollects that some ships off the Mumbai harbour which had been taken over by the protesting Indian sailors had even trained their guns in defiance on the iconic Taj Mahal hotel. So apprehensive were the British that they even brought in an aircraft carrier (HMS Glory) and a cruiser (HMS Glasgow) to Mumbai as a show of force. Admiral Nadkarni remembers having been taken in a group to see the Glasgow. He also fondly remembers having been part of a group of cadets who were taken to Ballard Pier to witness the commissioning of India's first warship, the INS Delhi, by Prime Minister Nehru.

Volunteering with sixteen other cadets to join the RIN, Jayant Nadkarni and fifteen other cadets set sail for the UK in March 1949 on the HMS Ranchi, with some officers and sailors who were selected as crew members of the three R-class destroyers (Rajput, Ranjit and Rana), which were to be the next acquisitions for the RIN from Britain. After four-and-a-half years of rigorous training on various ships and at various shore establishments including the Royal Navy College at Greenwich, Nadkarni returned to India in 1953 on the Indian Navy's latest acquisition INS Ganga after participating in the queen's coronation review. Training was tough with no trips back home to see the family, he recollects, and the sixteen Indians had for company a motley bunch of aspiring naval officers from other dominions like Canada and Pakistan. The exposure too was excellent with Nadkarni getting an opportunity to train on the HMS Indefatigable, an aircraft carrier, and HMS Bleasdale, a Hunt-class destroyer.50Interview with Admiral Jayant Nadkarni on 3 December 2014. The eighty-two-year-old admiral was happy to share his experiences during the fledgling years of the Indian Navy. By the time Nadkarni returned to India, the Royal Indian Navy had become the Indian Navy after India became a republic on 26 January 1950.

Numbers mean a lot even if there is not much to take home! At Independence, a Defence Service Partition Committee51Also see, Vice Admiral Mihir Roy, War in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1995), p. 54–55. was constituted with senior Indian and Pakistani naval officers on it to divide all RIN assets between India and Pakistan in a ratio of 2:1. While India retained thirty-three ships including WW II vintage sloops, minesweepers and motor launches, these were complemented with more recent vessels like frigates and corvettes. How recent would be a matter of opinion as Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan, an erudite seaman-cum-scholar, would term India's fleet of 1947 as barely being able to steam away from the Bombay harbour.52From a personal discussion with Vice Admiral Pradeep Chauhan on the importance of military history on 12 August 2015. Pakistan, on the other hand, retained sixteen vessels of the same variety.53James Goldrick, No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945–1996 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1997), p. 12. Also see Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 1945–50 (New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing, 1986), 'Division of the RIN' (behind the Contents page). The figures in his book are at slight variance to the ones mentioned above. While there is no difference between Goldrick and Satyindra Singh on the division of major vessels, there are minor variations with respect to smaller vessels like harbour defence motor launches (HDML). By September 1948, the RIN had added on a large cruiser, HMIS Delhi, with Commander Katari (later the first Indian chief of naval staff) as the first Indian commanding officer. It was inducted into the Indian Navy with much fanfare on 13 September 1948 and escorted into Bombay harbour by HMIS Krishna with Admiral Hall, the FOCRIN, on board and in the presence of Prime Minister Nehru.54'Delhi becomes Flagship,' Bombay Chronicle, 15 September 1948, p. 7. In a departure from his earlier disdain for building military capability55This disdain comes out clearly in Chapter 8. and chastened in no small measure by the events of the last one year (the ongoing war with Pakistan), Prime Minister Nehru emphasized the need for building deterrent military capability. Speaking on the occasion and displaying glimpses of his dilemma he said:

It may seem curious that the Indian people who have always stood for peace should rejoice and take pride in the possession of a unit of war such as HMIS Delhi. But on a deeper view, it is not curious at all, for it is not enough to have the desire for peace. We must also have the determination and means to keep peace.56'India determined to protect peace,' Bombay Chronicle, 16 September 1948, p. 10.

By 1949, the RIN had acquired greater punch with the commissioning of three more R-class destroyers and one landing craft and the stage was set for it to dominate the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal for years to come. Interestingly, the finances for these purchases were adjusted against the large Indian credit that remained with Britain after Independence and also was a clever way of decommissioning the hundreds of ships that remained after WW II.57Interview with Admiral Nadkarni. International navies too came calling at Indian ports, prominent amongst them being a complement of three naval warships of the US Navy, which came on a five-day goodwill visit to Bombay in August 1948 on the eve of one year of India's Independence.58'US Warships on 5 Day Goodwill Visit to City Harbour,' Bombay Chronicle, 24 August 1948, p. 1.

After all the downsizing and retrenchment of the RIN, the Indian and Pakistani navies were left with resources that were totally inadequate for coastal defence leave alone protection of SLOCs. One could say that considering the small coastline that Pakistan had compared to India and its islands of Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep, Pakistan had no cause for complaint. However, Jinnah argued that Pakistan needed a larger navy to protect trade from East to West Pakistan from predatory Indian warships – something Mountbatten ignored. An interesting titbit about the role of the RIN and the Indian National Army (INA) in ensuring that Andaman and Nicobar islands was handed over to India emerges in Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh's book. Despite strong objections from the British Ministry of Defence that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands should remain with Britain as an island outpost that overlooks the Straight of Malacca, much like Diego Garcia straddles the key sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, two issues swung the issue in India's favour. First, Subhas Chandra Bose had designs of setting up a provisional Indian government in exile when the INA landed in the islands with the Japanese in March 1942 and the fact that prisoners of India's independence movement were housed at the cellular jail created an emotional bond with the mainland. Second, it was asserted by the Indian naval officers that the island chain was important for India's maritime security. Both the desire of Britain to hold on to the Andamans and the Indian resolve indicated the strategic potential of the island chain. Whether India has converted that potential into capability over the almost seven decades since Independence is a moot point considering the slow pace at which it is being developed as a bulwark against great power encroachment into the Bay of Bengal. Anyway, that is an issue for maritime strategists to dwell on and not for a mere military historian to pontificate!

Shano Varuna is the Sanskrit motto of the Indian Navy, which translated into English means 'May the Lord of the Ocean be auspicious unto us'.⁶¹In Indian mythology, Lord Varuna is the all-powerful lord of the oceans.

The final issue to dwell upon is technology-related and its impact on the manning of the Indian Navy after Independence. The navy in those days was the most technology- and maintenance-intensive service by a long way. Along with the hundreds of years of dominance by British sea power, it resulted in great reluctance by British officers and ratings to transfer expertise to their Indian comrades at sea. This resulted in the Indian Navy having to retain British expertise the longest. As late as 1950, the RIN still had a complement of sixty-nine British officers, significantly more than what the RIAF had. The Indian Navy has always looked at itself in the post-Independence era as the Cinderella service; and not without reason in a land-centric strategic mindset for much of the twentieth century. An indicator of this lopsided perspective is reinforced by the defence budget of 1950, which saw the Navy garner only 4.7 per cent of the defence budget as against 8.93 per cent for the IAF and 72.62 per cent for the Indian Army.59Vice Admiral Mihir Roy, War in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1995), p. 57. As this peek into the historical legacy of the Indian Navy concludes, I have intentionally left out the glamorous naval aviators and the silent submariners, as I will briefly track their evolution in subsequent chapters. What of the broader contours of India's naval strategy? It was only too obvious that given the deep doctrinal influence of the Royal Navy, the Indian Navy would be modelled around British concepts of maritime strategy: sea denial, sea control and protection of commerce would emerge as key missions in the years ahead.60For a detailed reading of an Indian perspective on modern maritime strategy, see Rear Admiral Raja Menon, Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p. 55–61.