Part III: Teething Years
Surprise and Riposte
[SURPRISE AND RIPOSTE](part0002.html#INC9)
The first weeks were a desperate struggle to hold Srinagar whilst we marched troops to Jammu via Pathankot and built a road to Jammu. Our aim was clear. We had to gain time whilst we organized ourselves in India and flew in more troops and material into Kashmir.1Lieutenant General E.A. Vas, Without Baggage (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 1987), p. 13. This book was published by the author almost forty years after he had written it – it lay in cold storage through the officer’s entire career and was published after he retired.
– LIEUTENANT GENERAL E.A. VAS
INFILTRATION AND REACTION
By the time the Indian government got it its act together, Operation Gulmarg was well under way with thousands of tribals gathering in training camps and forming Lashkars (Persian name for organized tribal armies) in selected locations opposite the Poonch–Rajouri and Srinagar areas. These Lashkars were commanded by a tribal sirdar or malik to retain their non-state profile and complemented by a few regular officers and junior commissioned officers (JCOs) of the Pakistani army.2Rohit Singh, ‘Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947–48,’ Scholar Warrior (Autumn 2012): p. 134. A total of approximately twenty Lashkars of a thousand men each were created, ten each for the Srinagar and Poonch–Rajouri sectors. While the northern Lashkars comprised mainly seasoned Afridi and Mahsud warriors from the NWFP,3Joseph Korbel, Danger over Kashmir (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 73. the southern Lashkars comprised tribals and battle-hardened Poonchi Muslims, many with prior battle experience in WW II. These Muslim warriors were demobilized from the Indian Army after WW II and angered by the maharaja’s refusal to absorb them into the state forces of J&K. Frustrated at being denied a secure livelihood, they went back to their agrarian life, waiting for an opportunity to get back at the Hindu ruler of J&K.4Ibid., p. 67. The fury of this force would come to the fore in the bloody battles of Poonch, Rajouri, Jhangar and Haji Pir, where the Indian Army would face stiffer resistance as compared to the Srinagar sector.
The training period included extensive indoctrination of the tribals and Poonchi Muslims, calling for a jihad against the Hindu ruler of Kashmir as revenge for the persecution of Muslims in the state by Hindu Dogra troops.5In his fairly objective analysis of the reasons for tribal angst on the eve of Partition, Sumit Ganguly in his book The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947 liberally quotes Joseph Korbel from his book Danger in Kashmir. Backing these Lashkars was a regular infantry division of the Pakistan Army and an infantry brigade to back the tribal thrusts depending on how operations progressed.6Ibid.
The fairly calibrated primary objectives of the plan were to seize the Kashmir Valley, capture the vital towns of Rajouri and Poonch with the aim of dominating the approaches to Jammu, and lastly, to capture Gilgit and Skardu as a possible gateway to further advance towards Leh and other parts of Ladakh. The secondary objectives were to clear the entire area of the minority Hindu population and reward the tribals by allowing them to plunder, loot and ravage the prosperous state just as Nadir Shah and other invaders had done in the past. The Pakistan Army was expected to move in once the tribals had achieved their initial objectives to protect what Pakistan called the legitimate aspirations of the Kashmiri people, the majority of whom would be Muslims.
Operation Gulmarg at no stage anticipated a spirited riposte as it was felt that the state forces of Jammu and Kashmir would capitulate within hours, and the Indian Army would be too preoccupied with managing the refugee and communal crisis to intervene in time. In an extremely biased rendition of events, a clearly pro-Pakistan Alistair Lamb completely discounts and ignores the role of the Pakistan Army in the operations. He also assesses the total strength of raiders7Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 123. on all fronts including the Skardu–Leh sectors to be a meagre 7,000; a ludicrous figure indeed considering the number of areas they attacked. Lamb’s clean chit to the Pakistan Army was contradicted in August 1948 by none other than Zafarullah Khan, the foreign minister of Pakistan, when he admitted in the UN that three regular brigades of the Pakistan Army were supporting the raiders8Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2010), p. 135. after they had been pushed back by the Indian Army on all fronts.
The complete lack of situational awareness on the part of the J&K state forces is clearly brought out by Lieutenant General L. P. Sen in his eminently readable operational recollections of military events of the conflict in his book Slender Was the Thread. While skirmishes between the J&K state forces and Poonchi Muslims and other Pakistani tribals in the Jammu sector were reported right after Independence in August 1947,9Lieutenant General L.P. Sen, Slender Was the Thread (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1969), p. 34–36. these were primarily seen by the Government of India and the Maharaja of Kashmir as only an extension of the ongoing Hindu–Muslim riots in Punjab and the rest of the country. This strategic oversight allowed Colonel Akbar Khan to concentrate his forces in the area opposite Srinagar, making it appear more as a show of solidarity for their Muslim brethren, rather than any planned invasion. Despite a cautionary note from the HQs of the J&K state forces to Lieutenant Colonel Narain Singh, the Hindu commanding officer of the mixed battalion at Muzaffarabad, to send his Poonchi Muslim troops to rear formations at Srinagar and replace them with Hindu Dogra troops, he ignored the advice, believing that their loyalty to the regiment was stronger than their religious affiliation. He was soon proven to be wrong.10Ibid.
The raiders finally struck on 22 October 1947 and hordes poured into the Srinagar Valley in trucks and tractors along the main road that ran from Muzaffarabad to Srinagar via the picturesque towns of Domel, Uri and Baramulla. Opposing them along the way were a few companies of the Kashmir Brigade of the state forces of J&K, which were loosely strung along the Muzaffarabad–Srinagar road. Despite fierce opposition from Dogra (Hindu) soldiers of the state forces, the raiders overwhelmed the defences, abetted in no small measure by the defection of large numbers of Muslim troops of the J&K state forces.11Rohit Singh, ‘Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947–48,’ Scholar Warrior (Autumn 2012): p. 136–38. However Sen has also this to say about a large segment of Muslim loyalists:
One might form the impression from these incidents in Jammu and in Muzaffarabad area that Muslims of the state had risen against the Government and wished to join Pakistan. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Thousands upon thousands of Muslims in the Government, the State Forces and in the National Conference, the political party led by Sheikh Abdullah, braved death in stemming the invasion.12Lieutenant General L.P. Sen, Slender Was the Thread (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1969), p. 36–38. For the sake of objectivity and a differing viewpoint on the extent of Muslim support for the tribal invasion, Alastair Lamb offers a pro-Pakistan viewpoint in his book The Kashmir Problem. Similarly, Colonel Akbar Khan, the brain behind Operation Gulmarg, offers a fundamentalist and inflammatory opinion justifying the tribal invasion.
As the positions of the state forces were overrun, their withdrawal towards Uri and Baramulla was slow as they had to escort thousands of Hindu refugees towards Srinagar. Thousands more were massacred at Uri as Brigadier Rajinder Singh, the officiating chief of staff, rallied his troops to offer a spirited response around the town on the same evening.13‘Capture of Uri,’ The Hindu, 16 November 1947, p. 1. The special correspondent of the United Press of India reported that 30,000 civilians were believed to have been massacred as the raiders first captured Uri and then retreated as they were pushed back by the Indian Army. He went on to report that when the troops of the Union of India entered Uri, they found the town completely devastated and deserted by the raiders. Outnumbered and overwhelmed, the state forces blew up the only bridge on the River Jhelum that connected the motorable road the next day, and withdrew to defensive positions east of Uri14Ibid. as they continued to hold up the invaders from making a run for Baramulla and Srinagar. While this action did not stop the invaders, it certainly slowed them down, allowing vital time for the maharaja to negotiate, and for the Government of India to rush its negotiating team to Srinagar for an ‘on the spot assessment of the situation’. The spirited and gallant action by the state forces led by Brigadier Rajinder Singh practically ended with the death in action of their brave commander on 24 October although they managed to stall the advance to Baramulla till 26 October. For his brave rearguard action and inspiring leadership, Rajinder Singh was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, India’s second highest gallantry award. He was the first military hero of the Indo-Pak war of 1947–48.
With very little protection, the prosperous town of Baramulla with a sizeable Hindu population bore the brunt of the raiders’ greed, lust and religious bigotry. Women, children and even a British officer and nun were not spared as the tribals halted their advance, ransacking the town over the next two days for booty and pleasure as the white of the late autumn frost turned crimson with the blood of the hapless citizens of Baramulla. It is quite evident that whatever little formal military sense was there was thrown out of the window as tribal instincts took over and the raiders stayed at Baramulla for longer than planned. This singular lack of tactical acumen and operational focus saved Srinagar from falling to the invaders.
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA REACTS
The first direct Indian involvement was on 25 October when an Indian Air Force Dakota of 12 Squadron was hastily flown in from Agra to Delhi, where a quick crew change saw Wing Commander H.K. Dewan of Air Headquarters captaining the aircraft with V.P. Menon, the Government of India’s chief negotiator for amalgamating the various princely states into the Indian Union, and Colonel Manekshaw (later, a field marshal and chief of army staff) on board to see for themselves how grim the situation in Srinagar was. Grim it certainly was as Menon assessed that if the raiders continued at the rate at which they were advancing, they would be in Srinagar in a couple of days.15C. Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir: 1947–48 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 46. Menon and Manekshaw rushed back to Delhi with the maharaja’s prime minister and urged the government to authorize immediate military assistance. Overruling a number of apprehensions and so-called operational risks expressed by the two British service chiefs, General Lockhart and Air Marshal Elmhirst, foremost amongst them being the vulnerability of any air-landed forces at an unsanitized and unprotected airfield (Srinagar), Nehru took what is probably the most decisive military decision of his entire political career – ordering an Indian brigade to be immediately flown in to Srinagar. He supplemented this order with another one that called for formations to be prepared to march north for the defence of Jammu and the garrisons of Poonch and Rajouri. Concurrently, Sardar Patel, the tough and uncompromising home minister and his chief troubleshooter, V. P. Menon, secured the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on 26 October 1947. While there has been ample criticism of the procrastination of the Government of India in reacting to this crisis, due credit has to go to Nehru and Sardar Patel for acting as they did in the given circumstances. Some of the critical issues involved are analysed in the next chapter.
RECOVERY
The airborne eyes of the Indian Air Force at the time were four Harvard and one Oxford propeller-driven aircraft, which were mainly used in the visual and photo-reconnaissance role with hand-held cameras. They were only later fitted with integral cameras.16Air Marshal Bharat Kumar (retd), An Incredible War (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2009), p. 355. It is widely believed that the lone Oxford aircraft operating from Amritsar airfield provided the first reconnaissance inputs on 26 October, which indicated that the raiders were still approaching Baramulla and that Srinagar airfield was available for an air-landed operation.17Ibid.
Lieutenant Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai had just finished overseeing some training with his hardy Sikh troops and was headed for his office to tackle some of the routine administrative chores in a peace station when he received a call from the General Officer Commanding, Delhi and Punjab Area, Lieutenant General Dudley Russell – the call would change the lives of the Rai family, which was looking forward to their posting to Washington in the coming months. The orders for Rai and his band of intrepid Sikh warriors of 1 Sikh Regiment were crystal clear – it was to gather themselves as a fighting unit as quickly as possible and proceed to Palam airfield (Delhi) for a move to Srinagar. At Srinagar, they were to hold the airfield till reinforcements arrived, and, if possible, prevent the raiders from bypassing the airfield and heading directly for Srinagar town. Major S.K. Sinha, who was posted at Army Headquarters and entrusted with setting up the Rear Airfield Maintenance Organization at Palam, was a close friend of the Rai family. He had this to say about the colonel as 1 Sikh was preparing to depart Palam:
At the airfield, Rai caught a few winks – with my experience of war, I was convinced that calmness and self-confidence during stress and strain are important assets of a good commander.18Lieutenant General S.K. Sinha, A Soldier Recalls (New Delhi: Lancer, 1992), p. 99.
Wing Commander Bhatia, commanding officer of 12 Squadron, the only transport squadron of the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF)19After Independence, India’s air forces were called the Royal Indian Air Force till the ‘Royal’ prefix was dropped when India became a Republic on 26 January 1950. was neck-deep in marshalling his depleted resources of Dakotas and aircrew to meet various commitments. A veteran of WW II with extensive combat experience on the Burma front, where he flew Blenheim bombers and Vultee Vengeance fighters with the RAF and the RIAF, Bhatia was given command of the squadron considering his seniority and diverse flying experience. Soon after Independence, the squadron had to meet the requirements of humanitarian relief flights, undertaking VIP commitments as the political leadership flew across the length and breadth of the country in an attempt to control the ongoing communal riots. It also provided logistic support to a fighter squadron that was being deployed in Gujarat to coerce the Nawab of Junagadh into joining the Indian Union. This deployment would support a military intervention, should the nawab threaten to cede to Pakistan.20Air Marshal Bharat Kumar (retd), An Incredible War (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2009), p. 338–39. It was in this melée that he was asked to position three Daks, as the Dakotas were affectionately called, at Palam on the evening of 26 October 1947. Complementing the RIAF Dakotas at Willingdon airport were about six or seven civil Dakotas. Thus began one of the RIAF’s most successful demonstrations of air transport operations over a period of twelve months – comparable in many ways with the Berlin airlift that was undertaken with significantly larger resources in terms of aircraft and pilots available.
Taking off at the crack of dawn on 27 October 1947 (5 a.m.) and braving some ground fire as they descended into Srinagar, the three- aircraft formation led by Bhatia inducted the advance element of 1 Sikh into Srinagar airfield on a bright autumn morning. They were followed by the civil Dakotas as all the aircraft would carry out a total of twenty-eight sorties on that day to complete the induction of 1 Sikh and a battery of mortars by last light. On landing and hearing that the raiders were almost at the gates of Baramulla, Rai sent a company forward at dusk to reinforce defensive positions slightly east of Baramulla. As the raiders regrouped after overcoming stiff resistance from the Dogra troops of the J&K state forces and prepared for the final assault on Srinagar, he led the next two companies forward the next morning when he came to know that the raiders were over 4,000 strong. Sensing that their offensive foray forward was not sustainable and that the defensive positions around Baramulla were untenable, 1 Sikh commenced a timely withdrawal to a tactical high ground near Pattan, 17 miles from Srinagar – a move that may well have saved Srinagar as it put doubts in the minds of the raiders about the actual strength of the defenders.
With confirmed reports that the enemy had reached the outskirts of Baramulla on 27 October, the next morning saw fighters from the RIAF joining action with 1 Sikh around Baramulla. Two Spitfires got airborne from the Advanced Flying School, Ambala, and strafed enemy gun positions that were tying down Colonel Rai and his men as they attempted to gain a sense of the opposition.21The Spitfires belonged to the Advanced Training Wing of the IAF at Air Force Station, Ambala. The wing was commanded by Group Captain Arjan Singh, later Marshal of the Air Force. Operating on the fringes of their radius of action, they subsequently landed at Srinagar and remained there for some time, repeatedly carrying out strafing attacks under close control of 1 Sikh till the threat to Srinagar receded. An interesting story here is how the Spitfires refuelled at Srinagar. Amidst all the chaos as the Dakotas streamed in from Delhi and landed at Srinagar, they were requested to part with some fuel in return for IOU (I owe you) chits, which they were told would be honoured by government authorities at a later stage. It is this fuel that sustained the Spitfires and permitted them to operate from Srinagar airfield till refuelling facilities were provided. As for the IOU chits – they were soon forgotten!
Tragically, Rai’s vehicle was caught in a machine gun crossfire; he and his platoon commander were killed as they were withdrawing with the trailing elements of 1 Sikh and remnants of the state forces.22Lieutenant General L.P. Sen, Slender Was the Thread (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1969), p. 47–49. The action was as bold as the commander who led it; unfortunately it resulted in his death and a terrible loss to 1 Sikh and elements of 161 Brigade, which had started inducting into Srinagar. Lieutenant Colonel Rai was posthumously awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for his heroic exploits, daring initiative in the face of uncertainty and exemplary leadership. A lesser-known saga of bravery revolves around the exploits of two of Rai’s company commanders, Major Harwant Singh and Major Sampuran Bachan Singh. The latter was promoted to lieutenant colonel and took over command of the battalion after its gallant CO fell. A Military Cross winner from the Italian campaign of WW II, it was Harwant’s suggestion to fall back to Pattan that contributed greatly to baulking the raiders.23Mandeep Singh Bajwa, ‘1947 Gallantry awaits recognition,’ Hindustan Times, Chandigarh, 19 June 2012,
By now it was clear that the need of the hour was to get an accurate sense of the enemy disposition, strength and direction of movement towards Srinagar. Operating from Jammu and Amritsar by end-October 1947, 7 Squadron of the RIAF, also called ‘The Battleaxes’, was the first squadron to undertake this task by carrying out visual reconnaissance sorties along the Domel–Baramulla–Pattan road using the Tempest aircraft. Air Marshal Randhir Singh, now a sprightly ninety-three year-old with crystal-clear recollections of the time, was the first one to carry out the reconnaissance – he recounts how the squadron moved from Agra to Jammu and Amritsar and operated into the Valley from there.26Telephonic conversation with Air Marshal Randhir Singh on 11 October 2013. Tempests also continued to strafe the advancing enemy as they spread out into the Valley and attempted to neutralize 1 Sikh, which was fighting a brilliant defensive battle. On 29 October, two Tempest fighter aircraft from 7 Squadron at Jammu made repeated strafing runs against tribal convoys on the Domel–Baramulla–Pattan road. Flight Lieutenants Roshan Suri, Randhir Singh and J. J. Bouche reported seeing up to seventy-seven buses and vehicles with tribals and went on to wreak havoc amongst them. These actions allowed Army HQ some breathing time to further strengthen 161 Brigade and plan the defence of Srinagar with some accurate intelligence. But more about that later as we still stay with the defensive battle around Srinagar.
After the initial skirmishes around Baramulla and Pattan and the casualties suffered by 1 Sikh, it was clear that additional forces would be required to save Srinagar. After a hasty staff visit to Srinagar on 29 October by Colonel L.P. Sen from Military Intelligence and a thorough staff check by Brigadier Thapar, the director of military operations, the mood turned sombre in Delhi. Added to this was an input to Pandit Nehru from an independent source that the situation was near normal in Srinagar. Confusion prevailed and the PM was furious27Lieutenant General L.P. Sen, Slender Was the Thread (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1969), p. 55–57. when Army HQ sought clearance for additional forces to be airlifted to Srinagar. However, to his credit, Nehru calmed down when even the British C-in-C General Lockhart concurred with the military assessment. Finally, the green signal was given to reinforce 161 Brigade, which had by 30 October deployed around Srinagar in battle-ready formations.
GALLANTRY
By 31 October, 161 Brigade had almost four battalions with slightly over 3,000 personnel comprising a combination of 1 Sikh, 2 Punjab, 1 Kumaon, 4 Kumaon and a battery (six guns) of artillery around Srinagar. They were deployed at tactically sound positions to defend the airfield and prevent the raiders from bypassing it and making a direct run for Srinagar.28S.N. Prasad and Dharam Pal, ed., Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947–48, an official history sponsored by India’s Ministry of Defence (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 2005), p. 34–35. This was also the time when an ad hoc command structure came up for the defence of Kashmir. A recently promoted brigadier, L.P. Sen, was appointed the brigade commander of 161 Brigade with Colonel Harbaksh Singh as his deputy and placed under J&K Force, which was commanded by Major General Kulwant Singh. By late evening on 2 November, Sen was concerned about reports that the raiders had realized that expecting a free run along the highway to Srinagar was a pipe dream and had changed their tactics. Consequently, when faced with stiff opposition at Pattan, they had split themselves into two attacking elements – one following the highway, and the other moving cross-country to the south, threatening the airfield from Badgam. The next morning, he sent out a large offensive patrol in the direction of the raiders with three companies of the 4 Kumaon Regiment, of which one of the company commanders was Major Somnath Sharma.
Major Somnath Sharma, a high-pedigree soldier with loads of operational experience with Slim’s XIV Army in Burma, was an alumnus of the Royal Indian Military College (RIMC) and passed out from the Indian Military Academy in 1942. At the young age of twenty-one he was Mentioned-in-Despatches for his gallantry and outstanding efficiency as the ‘DA & QMG’ at a brigade headquarter in Burma.29From the School Chronicles of RIMC, Dehradun, the alma mater of Major Somnath Sharma. On one occasion during the battle in Burma, Somnath’s orderly, Bahadur, was badly injured and was carried to safety under fire by Somnath himself despite being ordered by his commanding officer, to leave him behind as they were slowing the pace of the column. In 1947, he was the adjutant of 4 Kumaon Regiment when the regiment was ordered into action. Despite his hand being in plaster, he insisted on accompanying his battalion into action. Major Sharma’s company was ambushed in the town of Badgam by raiders firing from houses and appearing from all around, supported by heavy machine gun and mortar support.30Lieutenant General L.P. Sen, Slender Was the Thread (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1969), p. 72–75. Also see Rohit Singh, ‘Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947–48,’ Scholar Warrior (Autumn 2012): p. 138 It is during this battle that he called for air support on wireless and two Spitfires were on the scene in minutes during the late evening, strafing the tribals31Air Marshal Bharat Kumar (retd), An Incredible War (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2009), p. 311. with the help of a scruffy little map given to them by the brigade commander till their ammunition ran out.
Outnumbered heavily, Major Sharma’s Kumaon company suffered heavy casualties on 3 November 1948 and his last wireless transmission indicated that his position was under heavy fire till a blast indicated that a mortar shell had landed close by and probably killed him. Like Colonel Rai, Major Somnath Sharma too died leading his troops in the thick of battle. Along with him perished Subedar P. S. Mehta and twenty others. His last message to the brigade headquarters was: ‘The enemy is only 50 yards from us. We are heavily outnumbered. We are under devastating fire. I shall not withdraw one inch but will fight to the last man and last round.’ The fierce resistance put up by the Kumaonis also resulted in serious injuries being inflicted on the main leader of the tribals, who had to be evacuated rearwards to Baramulla. The impact of this battle and significant losses suffered as a result of the aerial attack by the two Spitfires resulted in the raiders again overestimating the strength of the Indian opposition and abandoning their advance. Srinagar airfield had been saved in a second joint battle. This again allowed Brigadier Sen to build up forces for a final decisive battle that was to be fought a few days later. Major Somnath Sharma was posthumously and deservedly decorated with free India’s first Param Vir Chakra.
A word here about the continuing airlift into Srinagar by 12 Squadron and other Dakotas requisitioned from civil airlines. While the three or four Dakotas from 12 Squadron continued to fly round the clock till 161 Brigade (3,500 troops) was fully inducted into Srinagar by 6 November32Air Vice Marshal A.K. Tiwary, Indian Air Force in Wars (New Delhi: Lancer, 2012), p. 43. with four battalions (1 Sikh, 1 Kumaon, 4 Kumaon and 2 Punjab), some supporting artillery and other logistic elements, the contribution of the civilian pilots and their machines needs to be acknowledged repeatedly. Having requisitioned all the available Dakotas from 12 Squadron for the airlift (not more than four to five aircraft were available at any time), the Government of India requisitioned all civil Dakotas to supplement the IAF ones. The bravery of the civilian pilots has largely gone unnoticed with many of them having served in the IAF as part of the Civilian Volunteer Reserve Force and then having demobilized after the war (refer to the IAF chapter) to take up a career in the fledgling civil aviation sector. However, none of the civilian pilots who took part in the airlift have chronicled or written about their experiences during this most decisive air mobility operation. Paying tribute to these intrepid aviators who rose to the call of duty, Sen writes:
Despite all dangers and normally unacceptable hazards, the pilots of the civil airline companies cheerfully undertook flights into the Kashmir Valley with aircraft loaded with troops, ammunition and stores. They judged their loads visually and they were lavish in their load acceptance. In almost every case, the aircraft were loaded to a point, which would have confounded the manufacturers. The courage and devotion to duty displayed by the civilian pilots and their crews played a decisive part in saving Kashmir from the ravages that threatened it.33Lieutenant General L.P. Sen, Slender Was the Thread (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1969), p. 45.
Shalateng is a small hamlet about 15 miles west of Srinagar astride the Baramulla–Srinagar highway, and it is at this hamlet on 7 November that one of the finest tactical set-piece battles turned the tide in favour of 161 Brigade and pushed the raiders back to Baramulla and beyond. Brigadier Sen’s deputy, Colonel Harbaksh Singh aggressively sent two battalions (1 Sikh and 1 Kumaon) forward to meet the raiders frontally at Shalateng and, in an outflanking manoeuvre that completely surprised the raiders, had a small force of Daimler Ferret armoured cars from 7 Cavalry Regiment led by Lieutenant Noel David come in from behind and decimate the opposition in a vicious crossfire.34Ibid., p. 78–100. While Sen in his book claims to have orchestrated the Battle of Shalateng, an interesting perspective on the Battle of Shalateng is offered by Major General Kuldeep Singh Bajwa in his book Jammu and Kashmir War, 1947–1948: Political and Military Perspective, published by Har Anand Publishers in 2003. Bajwa claims that Harbaksh Singh and not L.P. Sen actually controlled the battle and that the appearance of 7 Cavalry from the rear echelons of the raiders’ position was a result of Lieutenant David losing his way and then finding himself in an advantageous position to surprise them. See p. 130–33. Also see Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, In the Line of Duty (New Delhi: Lancer, 2000), p. 204. Harbaksh writes in his memoir that L.P. Sen came on the scene at the Battle of Shalateng only after the raiders were in full retreat. Surprised and sandwiched, the raiders turned and bolted. Once a clear demarcation between Indian troops and the retreating raiders was available, Tempests from Amritsar/Jammu and Spitfires from Srinagar caused mayhem amongst the retreating vehicles with raiders in them. Amongst the key pilots with recollections of the Battle of Shalateng is Air Marshal Randhir Singh. He firmly recounted the havoc which his Tempest’s 20mm cannon created amongst the tribals as he strafed them while they were in retreat.35Mandeep Singh Bajwa, ‘Tempests on the Attack in Kashmir,’ Hindustan Times, Chandigarh, 26 January 2014, available at
PURSUIT
When 161 Brigade entered Baramulla on 8 November, they were met with an eerie and deathly silence and clear signs of a massacre having taken place. Even the battle-hardened veterans of WW II were shocked at the brutality of the raiders as they had vandalized what had been a prosperous town. As they retreated, the tribals had torched all that could be set fire to – houses, fields, godowns, and the sky was crimson as Sen and his troops entered Baramulla. In his own words, Sen narrates:
The sight that greeted us in Baramulla is one that no period of time can erase from the memory. It was completely deserted, as silent as a tomb with not even a whimpering pie dog. Everywhere one looked, whether it was a house or a shop or a shed, there were signs of pillage, arson or wanton destruction. There were unmistakable signs that the patients in the hospitals had been slaughtered in their beds or dragged out to meet the same fate in the compounds.36Lieutenant General L.P. Sen, Slender Was the Thread (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1969), p. 103. Also see Papers of S.P.P. Thorat, ‘Report on Kashmir Massacres,’ NMML, New Delhi. Conducted by Justice J.L. Kalam and Shri Bamzai, 289 Muslims were witness to a spate of massacres of Hindus in Muzaffarabad, Rajouri, Badgam, Teethwal and Handwara.
From all the narratives that exist on the ravaging of Baramulla, it was as though Nadir Shah, Timur Lane and Ahmed Shah Abdali,37Mongol warlord Timur Lane invaded India in the fourteenth century, plundering and laying waste the city of Delhi before heading back to Central Asia. Nadir Shah was a Persian king who invaded India in 1738–39 and ruled for a year before reinstating Muhammad Shah as a weak Mughal emperor of India. His invasion more or less heralded the rapid decline of the mighty Mughal Empire. three invaders from the past, were back in Baramulla. Witnessing this brutality, the Indian troops were more than determined to push forward and evict the raiders completely from Kashmir. Forging ahead with aerially inducted reinforcements and much needed armour support in the form of one troop of 7 Cavalry with WW II vintage armoured cars, 161 Brigade reached Uri on 13 November. They had advanced almost 100 km on foot from Srinagar over less than two weeks, fighting their way through semi-mountainous terrain. It was no mean feat by any standards and by any logical tactical reasoning; their next objectives would be Domel, and possibly even Muzaffarabad.
During this phase of operations it was mainly 7 Squadron of the Royal Indian Air Force with Tempest fighters operating from Jammu, and a handful of Spitfires from Srinagar, which provided excellent close air support during the battles of Pattan, Badgam and Shalateng, apart from interdicting enemy columns on the road axis of Muzaffarabad–Domel–Uri–Baramulla–Pattan. To give the reader an idea of air operations, the aircraft would get airborne from Jammu; fly almost 300 km over the Pir Panjal range before getting down into the Kashmir Valley and operate over the battle area. Often braving bad weather, they would take on either immediate targets based on the requirements of the ground troops, or carry out search-and-strike missions over the road axis as mentioned above. The two squadrons together flew approximately fifty to sixty sorties or 100 to 120 hours in the Srinagar sector during this critical phase of battle between 28 October and 13 November 1947.38These figures have been extrapolated from the squadron operational record books and figures given by Air Marshal Bharat Kumar in his book. See Air Marshal Bharat Kumar (retd), An Incredible War (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2009), p. 311, 332. By 14 November, the rout was complete and the raiders were in complete disarray as they retreated. Colonel Akbar Khan, who had assumed the name of General Tariq during the operation, was witness to the collapse of his plan at Uri and lamented on seeing barely a dozen raiders and nothing but ‘disappearing tail lights of departing vehicles’.39Major General Akbar Khan, Raiders over Kashmir (Karachi: Army Press, 1992), p. 68. From Narendra Singh Sarila, The Shadow of the Great Game (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2009), p. 352. Two more Tempest squadrons of the RIAF, Nos 8 and 10 Squadrons, would join battle in December as multiple fronts opened up.
THE INITIAL FOG OF WAR
It is at this point that one gets to closely examine the fog of war that existed during the initial stages of battle. The tactical imperatives in the Valley rarely matched the operational perspectives at J&K state forces headquarters at Jammu and the politico-strategic compulsions at Delhi. As the brigade commander with some additional resources and a string of victories under his belt, ‘Bogey’ Sen, as he was affectionately called from his WW II days, felt that the time was ripe to push the raiders back into Pakistan. He was overruled by Lockhart and Elmhirst, the British army and air force C-in-Cs, who were overcautious in their assessment and felt that 161 Brigade had overstretched itself and that there was inadequate air support to prosecute an offensive battle with winter around the corner. Elmhirst also restrained the RIAF from attacking the bridges around Domel and Muzaffarabad as Messervy, the British C-in-C, wanted them intact. However, it was a politico-strategic and logistic compulsion that forced Brigadier Sen to halt his advance at Uri and divert a large force to head south and relieve the beleaguered garrison of Poonch.
Fully aware of the ongoing horrors of Partition and briefed by his staff on the massacre of both Hindus and Muslims at Baramulla, Uri and Rajouri by the advancing raiders, the deteriorating situation around Poonch forced Nehru to overrule both his British C-in-Cs and his Indian operational commanders by ordering ‘an immediate relief of Poonch by all possible means’. In retrospect, it was the right decision for an advance to Domel would have surely meant the fall of Poonch and a great psychological victory for the raiders. The second front had to be opened in the third week of November! Apart from diverting part of Bogey Sen’s 161 Brigade to get to Poonch from the north before the tribals got there, Major General Kulwant Singh, the GOC of J&K state forces, ordered the elite 50 Para Brigade to advance on Poonch from the south. D.R. Mankekar, a correspondent then with The Times of India, and later a successful writer, reported that it was fuel shortage that initially stopped Bogey Sen’s brigade at Uri and allowed Nehru time to re-orchestrate his strategy. He reflects:
Here was one of the great ‘ifs’ of the war. If the Indian Army had not run out of petrol at that critical moment and pursued the raiders, it would have reached Muzaffarabad, the border town of the state of Jammu and Kashmir; and then the western part of the state, now Pak-occupied, would have been ours for the asking.40D.R. Mankekar, Leaves from a War Reporter’s Diary (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1977), p. 152–53.