Part III: Teething Years
The War Drags On
[THE WAR DRAGS ON](part0002.html#INC10)
In early May, with the Spring Offensive approaching, Mountbatten asked Bucher (the British C-in-C of the Indian Army) to instill in the government the notion that India was militarily impotent in order to reduce the risk of an all-out war after his departure from India in June.1C. Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir: 1947–48 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 206.
THE POONCH SAGA OF VALOUR
The second thrust line of the raiders of Operation Gulmarg was in the Rajouri and Poonch sector. This area lies to the south of the Kashmir Valley and is separated from it by the Pir Panjal range. This range rises up to 15,000 feet and includes a number of traversable passes like the 8,000-ft-high Haji Pir Pass, which offered significant military potential. Control of these passes and this area was essential for dominating the roads that linked Jammu with Srinagar through Udhampur and the Banihal Pass and also those that ran westwards into Pakistan. Having concentrated opposite Mirpur and Kotli, and emboldened by the initial success in the Baramulla sector, eight to ten Lashkars crossed over and overran the town of Rajouri by the beginning of November, laying it to waste, and advanced towards the strategically important town of Poonch. With a population of almost 50,000 including almost 40,000 Hindus, many of whom were prosperous traders and state government officials, with the rest being Poonchi Muslims,2For a detailed official record of the siege of Poonch, see Chapter XIII, ‘The Relief of Punch,’ in S.N. Prasad and Dharam Pal, ed., Operations in Jammu and Kashmir: 1947–48 (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Historical Division), p. 238–62. the town was a lucrative target. From an Indian perspective, Poonch had to be held at all costs!
With the diversion of a two-battalion-sized force from Uri began the heroic defence of Poonch, a relatively unsung saga of bravery, innovation and grit on the part of common people. Much like the Berlin Blockade of 1948–49, the major difference was that Berlin was not subjected to attacks and shelling in the manner that Poonch was. Climbing and clawing their way past the raiders at Haji Pir Pass, and traversing across two destroyed bridges on the Battar Nullah, a tributary of the River Poonch, Lieutenant Colonel Pritham Singh and his 1 Kumaon Regiment fought their way into Poonch by 22 November and commenced setting up defences for the winter, while the remainder of 161 Brigade headed back for Uri after suffering heavy losses en route and hearing that the raiders had regrouped there.3Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, In the Line of Duty (New Delhi: Lancer, 2000), p. 213–17.
Due to the failure of the link-up with a relief force coming from the south in the form of the elite 50 Parachute Brigade, which encountered stiff resistance on the road from Jammu at places like Naushera and Jhangar, Poonch was literally blockaded by the raiders from all directions. Thus, the first major challenge for Brigadier Pritham Singh (he was promoted overnight to the rank of brigadier and assumed command of the Poonch Garrison) was to build an airstrip that would facilitate the sustenance of the town via an air bridge. Pritham achieved this monumental task by mid-December 1947 with the help of over 6,000 citizens of Poonch.4Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Cohen, Thunder over Kashmir (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1955), p. 19. The next challenge was to impress upon the IAF that the only way of sustaining the town through the long winter, or till the link-up force that was coming from the south opened the road link to Jammu, was by ensuring a steady stream of aerial replenishment.
MAGNIFICENT FLYBOYS
Air Commodore Mehar Singh, DSO, or Baba Mehar Singh as he was called because of his thick beard, had gathered a reputation from WW II as being one of the boldest aviators of his times. Promoted to the rank of air commodore in November 1947 after having flown all types of aircraft in the IAF inventory, he was assigned command of the 1 Operational Group in Jammu and Kashmir.5P.S. Chanana, ‘The Air Warrior Who Knew No Fear,’ The Tribune, Chandigarh, 25 May 2011. Leading from the front, he carried out a trial landing on 8 December at Poonch airstrip in a Harvard trainer with Air Vice Marshal Subroto Mukerjee, the senior-most Indian officer in the RIAF, on board as his co-pilot. He then took on the onerous responsibility of being the first one to land a fully loaded Dakota at Poonch along with Flying Officer Pushong as captain of the aircraft a few days later on the 750-yard-long makeshift airstrip6Air Marshal Bharat Kumar (retd), An Incredible War (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2009), p. 340. There are conflicting claims that the airstrip was actually a mere 600 yards. See Rana Chhina, The Eagle Strikes: The Royal Indian Air Force, 1932–1950 (New Delhi: Ambi Knowledge Resources), p. 270. Also see Air Vice Marshal A.K. Tiwary, Indian Air Force in Wars (New Delhi: Lancer, 2012), p. 55. that had been prepared by Pritham Singh and his men. Carrying 6,000 lb of freight, which mainly included food and rations for the garrison, they set standards for the rest of 12 Squadron to emulate for the next one year as it maintained an air bridge to Poonch. To give you an idea of the monumental airlift, the operational record book of 12 Squadron indicates that between 10 and 20 December, almost 4,30,000 lb of load including light artillery guns were flown into Poonch.7The operational record book of the single transport squadron of the IAF (12 Squadron) between September 1947 and April 1948 reveals stupendous figures of 3,404 hours flown, three million pounds of supplies flown in or dropped, 4,000 troops transported, 10,000 refugees evacuated and over 1,000 casualties flown out. Also see Air Marshal Bharat Kumar (retd), An Incredible War (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2009), p. 345. So committed was the squadron to sustaining Poonch that it undertook night operations to deliver 25-pounder artillery guns that were badly needed by the defenders to counter enemy bombardment from the surrounding hills.8Rana Chhina, The Eagle Strikes: The Royal Indian Air Force, 1932–1950 (New Delhi: Ambi Knowledge Resources), p. 271–72. These guns were the only ones that had the necessary loft angle and range to target the raiders in their vantage positions around Poonch.
Mehar Singh also spearheaded night bombing by Dakotas of 12 Squadron in the hills around Poonch as gallant crew fused the bombs and then rolled them down from the rear. The greatest impact of these bombing missions was seen on 14 December 1947 when five Dakotas dropped a large number of 250-lb bombs on enemy positions around Poonch. This caused great confusion amongst the raiders and demoralized them and hampered their night raids around Poonch. Lieutenant General Eric Vas, a distinguished soldier with loads of combat experience and leadership, was a young major with the J&K division during the 1947–48 operations. His account of the war in the Poonch sector includes magnanimous appreciation for the Royal Indian Air Force as it assisted in sustaining Poonch for almost a year. He writes:
Poonch, cut off from the rest of JAK FORCE, continued to fight back at the enemy encircling the stronghold from all sides. To a great measure, the credit for their ability to do so goes to the audacious and untiring efforts of the Indian Air Force who kept flying in valuable stores and manpower into Poonch.9Lieutenant General E.A. Vas, Without Baggage (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 1987), p. 80.
GARRISON HAPPENINGS
Reinforced by a major part of a Gorkha battalion and some artillery by late January 1948, Pritham Singh had gained the confidence to send out patrols to engage the enemy on adjoining hill slopes supported by light mortars and artillery. The summer months saw a stalemate with the raiders unable to break through the defensive cordon around Poonch and the Indian Army unable to break the siege. While an initial link-up was made in June with a third battalion fighting its way from the south and being welcomed by thousands of citizens, the actual siege of Poonch was lifted only in November when two brigade-sized forces cleared all the areas around Poonch, particularly from the south. The best tribute to the defenders of Poonch came from a young and articulate major from the Corps of Signals, Maurice Cohen, who was at the forefront of setting up communications in the Poonch and Uri sector. In one of the initial first-hand accounts of the conflict published in 1955 titled Thunder over Kashmir, he writes with passion:
Prime Minister Nehru’s main concern was the safety of the people there. But from a military point of view the fall of Poonch would have been disastrous. Nor would it have been creditable for the Indian Army if it were to abandon 45,000 men, women and children to their fate at this critical juncture.10Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Cohen, Thunder over Kashmir (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1955), p. 11.
I cannot but help staying with Maurice Cohen’s book for the simple reason that when I found the book in the station library at Air Force Station, Pune, it had not been borrowed for over twenty-five years – what a wonderfully engaging book it turned out to be! I was quite amazed to read of an operation called ‘Operation Grain’ where Brigadier Pritham Singh used to periodically send out large patrols to engage the raiders in the surrounding hills and in the ensuing confusion bring back large quantities of grain from the local granaries along with fresh vegetables and a variety of produce from the fields. There were also periods during the harvesting season when large numbers of civilians under strong military escort from the Poonch Brigade would spend hours harvesting the ready-to-pick grain and take it back to the town. Their safety would be ensured by the escort force, which would aggressively patrol the hills around during the period. As a result of this, despite being given the option of an airlift to safe refugee camps, the citizens of Poonch chose to stay back in their homes despite the risk. So high was their morale and confidence that they knew they would be safe in the hands of the Poonch Brigade.11Ibid., p. 21. Also see Lieutenant General E.A. Vas, Without Baggage (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 1987), p. 76. I end the initial saga of Poonch by describing a casualty evacuation operation from a small town called Potha after the first link-up (south-east of Poonch) by a young flying officer Dennis Barty from 12 Squadron. Cohen writes:
When salutes and greetings were over, the job of evacuating the casualties was taken in hand. An airstrip was hastily constructed. About 350 yards long, it was just enough for an Auster or Fairy Moth (small aircraft). We radioed for the plane and within a short time one was seen circling overhead. When eventually he did land we were disappointed that he could take away one casualty at a time. Soon afterwards a Dakota was seen circling overhead, but since our men knew that it needed about 1,000 yards for landing, they did not take notice of it. After a short while it was seen to be circling lower and lower as though it was about to land. Somebody said, ‘No it cannot be so, he will kill himself.’ Then it descended almost vertically and made a perfect landing though it just grazed the rough raised ground at the far end where it frantically braked and turned round. Everyone rushed to congratulate the pilot, Flying Officer D. Barty. Despite knowing that he could have been court-martialled for taking such a risk, he said nonchalantly, ‘I could not go away without landing, when I knew you lads seemed to be in an unpleasant position.’ All the casualties and refugees were emplaned and alas as he got airborne, it appeared that the plane was headed straight for the hill. Then, suddenly, the plane seeming to jerk upwards and miss the trees on top of the hill by inches. A week later, Major General Atma Singh, the GOC of the Jammu Division said at the Poonch Officers Mess, ‘I shall get this pilot the worst rocket that can be given for taking the risk without orders – At the same time I shall recommend him for the highest award I can.’12Ibid., p. 65.
True to his word Atma Singh ensured that young Barty would get his Vir Chakra!
The Poonch Brigade, comprising a little over two regular Indian Army battalions and some two battalions of state forces and volunteer militia, governed the town with the help of local citizens during the siege. This really was the first example of military-civic liaison in troubled areas; the Indian Army would be called on repeatedly in the years ahead to help restore equilibrium in strife-torn regions, particularly in remote frontier locations of the north-east and the state of J&K. I will return later in the chapter to the bloody initial battles fought by 50 Parachute Brigade under the redoubtable Brigadier Mohd Usman and the final assault by two brigades of the Indian Army (19 and 5 Brigade) in late autumn 1948 on the enemy around Poonch that led to a complete link-up between Jammu–Rajouri and Poonch.
BATTLE FOR THE ROOF OF INDIA
To its north and north-west, the central Kashmir Valley is separated from the Gilgit and Baltistan region, also called the Northern Autonomous Region in recent years by Pakistan, by the Burzil Mountains, a part of the Nanga Parbat range of the Great Himalayas. Across these mountains through the Burzil Pass at a height of 4,000 metres ran the ancient caravan route between Srinagar and Gilgit, the largest town of the region. Originally this westernmost part of the Ladakh province was under Dogra rule till the early part of the twentieth century; it was thereafter leased to the British by Maharaja Hari Singh and was seen as a defensive high-altitude buffer between British India and the Russian Empire as the ‘Great Game’ unfolded in the region. After Partition, it was assumed that the territory would be considered as a province of the princely state of Kashmir till accession to either India or Pakistan. To the east and north-east of the Kashmir Valley lay the main province of Ladakh, separated from the rest of Kashmir by the Great Himalayan and Nun Kun ranges.13Ibid. These ranges are traversable through the Zojila Pass and the Baralacha Pass, which connected Ladakh to the Kashmir Valley and the state of Himachal Pradesh respectively. All these passes would play a critical role in the conduct of the ‘Battle for the Roof of India’ as I would like to term the series of skirmishes and pitched battles that took place in these regions in 1947–48.
Emboldened by the initial success in the south and egged on by extremist propaganda that talked about massacre of Muslims by Dogra troops of the state forces,14Primarily offering a Pakistani perspective on the Kashmir conflict, Joseph Korbel highlights rumours of Dogra atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir as being one of the key precipitants of the tribal invasion of 1947. See Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistan Conflicts Since 1947 (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1999), p. 42. tribal laskhars played a prominent role in orchestrating a coup in Gilgit on 31 October 1947. Reinforced by large sections of the Gilgit Scouts, a regiment with a local Shia Muslim majority and a part of the J&K state forces, the force was led by a British officer named Major Brown. This was but one of many instances in which British officers of the Pakistan Army were believed to have actively assisted the raiders, and later, the regular Pakistan Army during the subsequent stages of the conflict.15Lieutenant General L.P. Sen, Slender Was the Thread (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1969), p. 188–91. The distribution of tribal Lashkars along the front by Colonel Akbar Khan was a tactical success as he had anticipated that the best chances for local support from jagirdars or local leaders was in the isolated northern areas where religious propaganda had good chances of succeeding in the predominantly Shia Muslim areas of Gilgit and Skardu. After the fall of Gilgit in early November 1947, it was quite easy for the raiders to build up a force of 3,000 to 4,000 troops comprising personnel from the Gilgit Scouts, Chitral Guards, tribal Lashkars and locally recruited fighters to launch two operations.16Rohit Singh, ‘Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947–48,’ Scholar Warrior (Autumn 2012): p. 152. The first was a frontal assault on Skardu and the second was an ambitious late-winter run to Dras, Kargil and Leh.
Skardu, the second largest town in Baltistan, was defended by a small force of the Gilgit Scouts and reinforced from Leh by a small force of the Kashmir Infantry led by Major Sher Jung Thapa.17Ibid., p. 148. For over six months from February to August 1948, the garrison gallantly fought back repeated attempts by the raiders to breach the defences at the Skardu Fort where Thapa had organized his defences. A request to pull back to Kargil was denied – it would have been suicidal to attempt a trek of almost 300 km with women and children. A request for aerial replenishment akin to what was being done at Poonch was not found feasible by Air Commodore Mehar Singh for various reasons, amongst them being uncertain weather conditions across the Burzil Mountains and the apprehension that Dakotas may not be able to sustain operations from the Skardu airstrip, which was located at a height of 9,500 feet.18Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal, My Years with the IAF (New Delhi: Lancer, 1986), p. 65. One of the big ‘ifs’ of the war revolves around this decision, but even if the Dakotas had managed to land there, the RIAF with its depleted Dakota squadron would have found it impossible to support both Skardu and Poonch from the air. However, Tempest fighter-bombers attempted to drop supplies in canisters with little success as many of them landed outside the fort19Ibid. 20. Interview with Air Chief Marshal (retd) Moolgavkar. and any attempt to retrieve them was met with vicious crossfire from raiders positioned at vantage points around the fort.
February 1948 also saw the regular employment of Tempest fighter-bombers of 8 Squadron of the RIAF during the battles in the Uri, Poonch and Skardu sectors. This was soon after the commencement of defensive operations by the Skardu garrison against the raiders from Gilgit and villages around Skardu, which emerged as fertile recruiting grounds for the raiders. Flight Lieutenant Mickey Blake of 8 Squadron, RIAF, whom Air Chief Moolgavkar recollects as an ‘excellent pilot, quite a daredevil and a popular flight commander of the squadron’, has this to say about his first sortie over Skardu area:
On 9 Feb 48 we had to climb to 26,000 feet because of cloud and we were blown off-course by strong easterly jet streams. However, we hit the River Indus and I was able to pin point where we were. We followed the River Indus in a westerly direction and hit Skardu and then Rondu where we hit our target with rockets. However, when we tried to strafe the area, our cannons failed to fire. I hope we gave the b\\\\\\s a fright. We flew alongside Mt K2, the second highest mountain, on our way to Rondu.21From the 8 Squadron war diary, Ministry of Defence, Historical Division. Also at
Having flown a little in areas like that ensconced in the comfortable cockpit of a Mirage-2000, wrapped in my high-altitude clothing with woollen inners and fleece-lined jackets, I can only marvel at the guts and seat-of-the-pants flying skill of pilots like Baba Mehar Singh, Mickey Blake, and Flying Officer Barty. Pilots those days wore plain chamois leather gloves and had to keep their fingers from going numb by constantly flexing them so that they could press the trigger. Their teeth chattered as they maintained radio contact and navigated across mountains and valleys by relying on vintage maps and what pilots call ‘a seat of the pant’ understanding of terrain. Oxygen masks were rudimentary contraptions and pilots had to literally suck the oxygen out to stay focused. Putting in rocket and bomb attacks at those altitudes stretched the machines to the edge of their flying envelopes and the aircraft ‘screamed, juddered and protested’ as pilots pulled out from attacks at dangerously low heights. It must truly have been exhilarating stuff!
Intelligence reports coming out of Skardu in early March 1948 indicated that a large group of more than 500 raiders and 200 porters had bypassed Skardu and were making their way towards Dras, Kargil and Leh.22Lieutenant General L.P. Sen, Slender Was the Thread (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1969), p. 194. Anticipating the threat to Leh a good fifteen days earlier, Brigadier Sen’s 161 Brigade, still the largest formation in the Valley, had to come up with a winter solution to reinforce the Leh garrison before it fell to the advancing raiders. A sense of topography, distance and time is important to understand the travails of foot-soldiering in high-altitude regions like Baltistan and Ladakh, particularly during the winter months when tracks and passes are snowbound and cross-country movement is virtually impossible.
The Ladakh Valley itself is at a base height of around 10,000 feet. Settlements are sprinkled at heights between 12,000 and 15,000 feet and mountain heights vary from 17,000 to 25,000 feet. Srinagar to Leh via Zojila Pass is about 360 km and Skardu to Leh is a similar distance. Therefore, in tactical terms, it was a race to Leh between the raiders and the Indian Army. Forty intrepid Lahaulis (Lahaul is a hilly province of Himachal Pradesh and is accessible to the rest of the state via the 14,000-foot-high Rohtang Pass) led by Captain Prithi Chand and his cousin Captain Kushal Chand from 2 Dogra Regiment, which had come in to reinforce 161 Brigade, set out from Srinagar in mid-February 1948 to try and breach the 16,000-foot-high Zojila Pass. Facing trying winter conditions; it was a feat that had never been attempted before. Acclimatizing en route, beating drums to trigger avalances and create paths, and losing radio contact for more than ten days, the column successfully traversed the treacherous pass and reached Leh by 8 March 1948.23‘The Relief of Leh,’ at
AIR BRIDGE TO LEH AND DEFENCE OF LADAKH
Major General Thimayya, one of India’s most celebrated post-Independence generals, was part of the Indian trio that commanded their battalions during WW II in Burma as part of the 51 Brigade, and the first Indian to command a brigade in Burma during the closing stages of WW II. It was this illustrious warrior who was in operational command of all forces in the Srinagar and Leh sectors. With Leh under immediate threat, it was left to his persuasive skills to get Air Commodore Mehar Singh to attempt a landing at Leh, which is at an altitude of 11,500 ft. I reckon that seeing the fate of Skardu and probably rankled by his earlier decision not to attempt a landing there, Baba Mehar Singh took upon himself the challenge of attempting a landing at Leh after hearing about Captain Prithi Chand’s frantic calls for reinforcements. Finally, on 24 May 1948, Mehar Singh, with Thimayya on board, landed at Leh in what was a red-letter day for military aviation in India. This feat opened the air bridge to Leh and despite spells of bad weather Mehar Singh himself repeatedly led missions of four and six aircraft into Leh for the next two weeks inducting a company of 2/4 Gorkha Rifles.24Ibid. He was one of the four RIAF pilots to be decorated with the Maha Vir Chakra for his daring feats of transport flying and inspirational leadership.
The combination of Lahaulis from 2 Dogra Regiment, Gorkhas from 2/4 and 2/8 Gorkha Rifles and 12 Squadron of the IAF saved Leh – a truly joint operation. They were joined a few months later by the remainder of 2/8 Gorkha Rifles. One company of the battalion under Major Hari Chand had opened the treacherous 325-km route from Manali to Leh through Rohtang Pass, the Lahaul and Spiti Valley of Himachal Pradesh, and the formidable Baralacha Pass, linking up with Leh garrison in late July 1948. The war diary of the regiment indicates that in late May 1948, two officers, four GOs (what we now call JCOs or junior commissioned officers) and 150 GORs or other ranks, as they are now called, set off across three 15,000-feet high passes with only civilian guides on a ‘two month route march across hostile terrain’ with only a prayer on their lips.25War diary of 2/8 Gorkha Rifles, January 1948–December 1960, Ministry of Defence, Historical Division, New Delhi. It was only after they were some way through their epic journey did the air bridge to Leh open. Their mandate was to ‘raise, train and equip a militia force and reinforce the garrison at Leh under Lieutenant Colonel Harischandra Sakharam Parab, CO of 2/8 GR, who was designated as Governor-Leh.’26Ibid. For his leadership during the long and hazardous trek and subsequent acts of bravery in numerous guerilla actions behind enemy lines in the Leh–Kargil and Dras sectors, Major Hari Chand was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.27Ibid.
Having staved off the threat to Leh, Thimayya’s focus would now shift to ensuring that both Kargil and Dras were cleared of the raiders as he tried his best to save Skardu. It is at this time – as summer set in – that Thimayya realized how short he was on troops to carry out operations in the Kashmir Valley and the Leh, Kargil, Dras and Skardu sectors. Attempts to send reinforcements to Skardu from Srinagar via Kargil in April and May were a complete failure as the force was continuously harassed and ambushed along the River Indus by tribals who were both well acclimatized and conversant with the topography of the region, unlike some of the Indian columns.28Rohit Singh, ‘Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947–48,’ Scholar Warrior (Autumn 2012): p. 148. For a fairly critical analysis of the Indian Army’s attempts to recapture Dras and Kargil and send reinforcements to Skardu in May 1948, see S.N. Prasad and Dharam Pal, ed., Operations in Jammu and Kashmir: 1947–48 (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Historical Division), p. 297–303. Gradually, the raiders came to dominate the whole area from Kargil to Zojila and it would take a Herculean effort in the months ahead to throw them back. As the raiders tightened their grip on the areas around Kargil and Dras in the summer of 1948, reports came in of the mass murder of Buddhist monks in Kargil by the Gilgit Scouts and Pakistan Frontier Rifles.29‘Mass Murder in Ladakh Valley – Invaders Swoop Down with Fire and Sword,’ Bombay Chronicle, 23 August 1948, p. 1. The lama of Ganskar Padam monastery was shot dead and the Rangdom Gompa, the second largest monastery in Ladakh, was desecrated and razed to the ground.30Ibid.
As the weather improved, repeated air strikes on Skardu using Tempest fighter-bombers were launched from Srinagar from 20 June onwards to try and cause maximum attrition to the raiders, replenish the garrison with ammunition by dropping them in canisters,31C.B. Khanduri, Thimayya: An Amazing Life (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2006), p. 131. and try and lift the siege. On 11 and 12 August fierce attacks were launched in the evening hours from eight till midnight, which were beaten back with significant casualties suffered on both nights by the attackers.32Bombay Chronicle, 17 August 1948, p. 1. Despite the gallant resistance by the defenders, Skardu finally fell on 14 August 1948 after repeated attempts to reinforce it failed. As in most other places all the Hindus and Sikhs in the garrison were massacred, while Major Sher Jung Thapa and a few others were taken POW.
The late Air Chief Marshal Moolgavkar recalled a few interesting events from 1948 that marked his tenure as commanding officer of 1 Operational Wing at Srinagar in an interview with the author in February 2013:
I was pulled out of Staff College, Wellington, in mid-1948 and before I knew, I was on a Harvard trainer aircraft from Delhi to Srinagar to replace Minoo Engineer as the CO of 1 Operational Wing at Srinagar. There was no briefing for me and I had to learn on the job immediately. There were detachments from three Tempest Squadrons (7, 8 and 10 Squadrons) operating from Srinagar by then and a few Spitfires. We mainly flew search-and-strike missions based on reports from the army liaison officer (ALO) and all the tactics we employed were adapted from the Burma campaign as we had no time to come up with new ones. The Tempest was the only aircraft capable of effective interdiction and the main weapons we used were 500 and 1,000 lb bombs, or 8 rockets and canons.33Interview with Air Chief Marshal Moolgavkar, 1 February 2013.
The fall of Skardu troubled Thimayya immensely34C.B. Khanduri, Thimayya: An Amazing Life (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2006), p. 132. and he tried his best to retake Skardu. Unfortunately, the difficult terrain, lack of acclimatization, and shortage of attacking formations in the correct ratios that were essential for mountain warfare ensured that it remained an unfulfilled dream. But that did not stop him from motivating the IAF to launch ferocious aerial strikes on Skardu, one of which had six Tempest aircraft attacking the Skardu Fort and blowing up an ammunition dump. Moolgavkar was part of the formation, which also included another future air marshal, Minoo Engineer. In her biography of Moolgavkar, Jyoti Rai, his daughter and an accomplished historian herself, wrote of the attack:
HM found it difficult to lead every mission and he particularly recalled the attack on Skardu on 24 October, 1948. Air Vice Marshal Aspy Engineer (Minoo Engineer’s elder brother and a future IAF chief) and Major Gen Thimayya were reviewing the attack in a Dakota. HM led six Tempest IIs, went in for a 25 degree dive attack, firing all eight R/Ps (Rocket Projectiles) together in one salvo and then pulled out safely. Afterwards, the pilots flying General ‘Timmy’ as Thimayya was affectionately called reported that he became very excited at seeing the attack on Skardu, and shouted ‘maro the sallas’ – literally translated meaning ‘hit the scoundrels’.35In conversation with Jyoti Rai, 1 February 2013.
Moolgavkar chuckled when he spoke about an incident in November 1948 when RIAF Tempest fighters on a bombing-and-strafing mission in the Northern Area spotted a Pakistani Dakota as they were returning after strafing Chilas airfield, about 260 km west of Skardu. Left with a few rounds, one of the Tempests chased the Dakota, shot at it and forced it to head back into Pakistan. Unconfirmed reports indicated that the Dakota was badly damaged and put out of action. His recollections were quite remarkable at the age of over 90 as I stumbled on a report of the Dakota incident in The Hindu newspaper during my numerous archival forays to the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.36‘Pakistan Dakota Chased by RIAF,’ The Hindu, API report, 11 November 1948, p. 4. From the NMML archives. This incident alarmed the Pakistanis who threatened to send fighter escorts with their Dakotas to ensure that they could keep the snowbound regions of Gilgit supplied from the air. Alarmed at the turn of events that could lead to aerial encounters between Pakistani and Indian fighters and a larger escalation of the air war, the British stepped up attempts to push both countries to the negotiating table and maintain status quo in Gilgit. For their repeated offensive forays in the Kashmir Valley, Skardu operations and leadership of 1 Operation Wing at Srinagar, Wing Commanders Minoo Engineer and Moolgavkar were deservingly amongst those awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.
SPRING BATTLES IN THE VALE
A history of the 1947–48 conflict with Pakistan would not be complete without a quick overview of the battles fought during the spring–summer offensive from April 1948 onwards by Thimayya’s Srinagar Division in the Tithwal, Uri and Domel sectors, and the bruising battles fought by the Jammu Division to regain the heights around Poonch, Jhangar, Mendhar and Naushera. As the conflict spread across three sectors, it became an operational necessity to restructure the command in the J&K sector as it was getting extremely difficult for a single commander to coordinate operations across such a wide front – literally from Skardu in the north to Naushera in the south. By March 1948, J&K state force was converted into a J&K corps under the command of Lieutenant General Cariappa. Before the conflict ended, Lieutenant General Srinagesh would take over as the corps commander with Cariappa moving up as army commander of the newly formed Western Army Command.37Ibid., 119–120. The J&K Corps was divided into the Srinagar Division (later 19 Division) commanded by Major General Thimayya, and the Jammu Division (later 26 Division), commanded by Major General Atma Singh. Air Commodore Mehar Singh continued to command 1 Operational Group of the RIAF from Jammu, while Wing Commander Moolgavkar commanded the main operational wing at Srinagar, which had by then inducted detachments of three Tempest fighter-bomber squadrons and a flight of Spitfires.38Jyoti Rai, Leading from the Cockpit (New Delhi: The Society for Aerospace Studies, 2010), p. 71–72.
The spring offensive in the Kashmir Valley was Thimayya’s idea and a trifle ambitious considering that his division was shedding forces to protect Leh. With only one division and hardly any reserves, he wanted to pursue the raiders till the Jhelum and recapture all the territory that was lost. Facing him were not only the tribal Lashkars and elements of the Pakistan Army, but also an entire Pakistan Army division, which had been cleared for action without its British officers as Frank Messervy, the British C-in-C realized that the Indian Army had to be stopped east of the Jhelum. Lord Mountbatten and his team of British C-in-Cs had firmed up a line of penetration that ran from Uri, Poonch, Rajouri and Naushera beyond which they felt that India would be in an unfair position to dominate the whole area.39For a macro and strategic perspective on the reasons why the British were reluctant to allow India to recapture the whole of Kashmir, see Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistan Conflicts Since 1947 (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1999), p. 41. Thimayya advanced towards Domel with three brigades. Sen and his battle-hardened 161 Brigade met with the toughest resistance at Chakoti in the form of a Pakistan Army brigade of the 7 Division on the main axis of Baramulla–Uri–Domel. A newly promoted Brigadier Harbaksh Singh and his 163 Brigade made significant progress to the north in the Tithwal sector and captured Tithwal, while Brigadier Nair and his 77 Para Brigade attempted to outflank enemy positions at Chakoti and come to Sen’s assistance40A Pakistani perspective in Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 66. but did not have sufficient firepower and reserves to do so. While the three brigades were poised to move ahead and threaten the Jhelum defences of Pakistan, they could have done so only if they had been backed by at least two to three reserve brigades, a move that was blocked by General Bucher. Despite fervent appeals from Thimayya and his brigade commanders, in particular Sen, the commander of the by-now over-stretched 161 Brigade, Bucher stood firm.
Having to commit more troops and offensive air support than anticipated to the high-altitude battle that was raging in the Zojila, Kargil and Dras sectors, Thimayya realized that he did not have the luxury of reserve troops as was the case when the British Army threw the Japanese back from Kohima in WW II. The Srinagar Division advanced as far as they did only because of the quality of leadership provided by Thimayya and his inspirational brigade commanders. The limited but ready offensive air support that was provided by Spitfires and Tempest fighter-bombers of Nos 7, 8 and 10 Squadrons along with their daring band of pilots complemented the tremendous fighting spirit of the Indian troops. Ultimately logistics and numbers stalled the offensive, much to the relief of Bucher and Gracey, the C-in-Cs of the Indian and Pakistani armies.
The situation in the south was as tough for the Indian Army as it was in the Kargil and Dras sectors, primarily because of the requirement of fighting in the hills and mountains to clear all the heights that were occupied by the raiders and the Pakistani army. Before the spring offensive was launched in the Kashmir Valley, the stranglehold established by the raiders and the Pakistan Army around Poonch had to be broken and the threat to Jammu had to be seen off. This entailed a series of bruising battles in the Jhangar–Naushera–Rajouri and Poonch areas, part of the second thrust line of Operation Gulmarg. The challenge in this sector was not only to relieve the siege of Poonch, but also ensure that the Srinagar–Jammu road was kept open. This was only possible if the many heights overlooking the highway, which were overrun by the raiders, were recaptured by the Indian Army. The summer of 1948 saw a significant escalation in this sector as Pakistan threw in greater artillery firepower in the form of 25-pounder guns, 4.2" mortars and 3.7mm howitzers against Poonch and other positions held by the Indian Army.41‘Foreign Aid to Pak,’ Bombay Chronicle, 17 August 1948, p. 1.
Of the many tough battles fought in this sector, I have chosen two battles that involved one of the finest field commanders who fought in this area – Brigadier Mohammed Usman, Commander of 50 Para Brigade.42Rohit Singh, ‘Brig Mohammed Usman, MVC, The Lion of Naushera,’ Soldier Scholar (Autumn 2010): p. 156. Part of the last batch of Indian officers who were trained at Sandhurst, Usman’s batchmates there included Sam Manekshaw and Mohammed Musa. While the former would go on to become India’s chief of army Staff during the 1971 war with Pakistan, Musa was at the helm of the Pakistan Army during the 1965 India–Pakistan war. Interestingly, Usman was the second-in-command of 16/10 Baluch Regiment in the Burma campaign when it was commanded by L.P. Sen as part of the 51st All Indian Brigade. Little did they realize that they would be commanding brigades on either side of the Pir Panjal ranges a few years later during the 1947–48 conflict.
Taking over command of the brigade in January 1948 from an ailing Brigadier Paranjpe after choosing to stay in the Indian Army, much to the disappointment of Jinnah, Usman found himself in a precarious situation of holding the town of Naushera despite being surrounded by thousands of tribals who were in control of Jhangar, Kotli and Rajouri. The only way that any progress could be made to relieve Rajouri and clear the way to Poonch was if Naushera and Jhangar were to be captured. Naushera is dominated by a height called Kot, approaches to which were occupied by a force of over 2,000 raiders. In response to General Cariappa’s request for Kot as a gift in February 1948, Usman and his brigade fought their way to the top in a bruising infantry battle that left the enemy with over 200 dead and many more injured. By doing so, Usman’s brigade was to inflict severe casualties on surprised attacking raiders a few days later, when an attempt was made to breach the defences around Naushera.43Ibid., p, 156–161.
In a predominantly army-centric battle, the exploits of 7 Squadron of the RIAF, first under Squadron Leader Noronha, and then Squadron Leader Masillamani, cannot be forgotten. Getting airborne from Amritsar, Tempests from the squadron pounded enemy troop concentrations and gun positions around Naushehra and Jhangar repeatedly, causing significant attrition to the enemy.44Air Marshal Bharat Kumar (retd), An Incredible War (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2009), p. 310–15. Thus, by early March, Usman was ready to move forward from Naushehra and take Jhangar back from the enemy along with 19 Brigade, which was commanded by another outstanding soldier with Spartan habits, a spiritual outlook and an indomitable spirit, Brigadier Yadunath Singh.45Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Cohen, Thunder over Kashmir (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1955), p. 54–55. The Battle of Jhangar, also called Operation Vijay, lasted three days and can be counted as one of the fiercest battles in the Jammu sector – two fine brigades of the Indian Army against an equal number of entrenched and widely dispersed tribals, who were supported by regular Pakistan Army artillery. In his battle order to the brigade, Usman proclaimed:
Death Cometh soon or late and how can man die better then facing fearful odds for the ashes of his fathers and the temples of his gods … So forward my friends, fearless we go to Jhangar, India expects everyone to do his duty.46Rohit Singh, ‘Brig Mohammed Usman, MVC, The Lion of Naushera,’ Soldier Scholar (Autumn 2010): p. 159.
A well-read man, Usman was combining the flair of inspirational English poetry and the words of his prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. After the battle, 50 Para Brigade was tasked with holding Jhangar while two other brigades (19 and 5) from Atma Singh’s newly formed 26 Division moved forward to Rajouri. Tragically, the ‘Lion of Naushera’, as Usman came to be known, was killed on 3 July in an artillery battle as he was walking around his gun positions. He was the senior-most officer of the Indian army to be killed in battle in the 1947–48 war and was honoured with a Maha Vir Chakra. He is buried in the heart of what is now the Jamia Millia University in Delhi and remains an inspiration to many students who throng the memorial service that India’s Parachute Regiment conducts every year to honour this gallant paratrooper.
In October and November 1948, the Poonch garrison came under renewed fire from a combined force of raiders and units of the Pakistan Army supported by Pakistani army artillery units. With the airstrip under constant fire, aerial resupply was getting increasingly difficult and Atma Singh, GOC of the Jammu Division, wanted Brigadier Umrao Singh, the former commander of the Poonch Brigade, to fly into Poonch and assess the situation. In a daring display of airmanship, Flying Officer Newby of 10 Squadron, RIAF, with Brigadier Umrao in a Harvard trainer aircraft escorted by two Tempest fighters, flew into Poonch braving intense small arms and ack-ack fire.4710 Squadron Operational Record Book (2010), Ministry of Defence, Historical Division, New Delhi. Two days later, in a similar operation, Umrao flew out after he had taken stock of the situation. For their exploits in battles around Naushehra, Jhangar and Poonch and later in support of Thimayya’s summer offensive, the two COs of 7 Squadron, Noronha and Massilamani were awarded the Maha Vir Chakra and Vir Chakra respectively,48Air Marshal Bharat Kumar (retd), An Incredible War (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2009), p. 321. while Squadron Leader Z.A. Shah, the CO of 10 Squadron, was awarded the Vir Chakra. Shah and Idris Hasan Latif, who was commanding another Tempest squadron that was not involved in the J&K conflict, were among the senior Muslim officers from the RIAF who chose to stay on with the IAF. Latif would go on to become a future IAF chief. The cavalier Mickey Blake too was awarded the Vir Chakra, being one among eight Anglo-Indians from the RIAF to be decorated for gallantry. Writing in a light-hearted manner in the squadron diary of 7 Squadron, Shah quipped:
The squadron has had its share of enemy MMGs, LMGs, bunkers and unavoidably, a large number of mules – poor buggers!497 Squadron Operational Record Book, October 1948, Ministry of Defence, Historical Division, New Delhi.
AUTUMN ENDING
As the Chinar leaves lay strewn across the bloody vale and the apple and saffron crops were laid waste by the war, the conflict stumbled along towards an impasse as the Pakistan Army openly joined the fray in the Srinagar, Rajouri and Poonch sectors. After repeated attempts by the Indian Army’s 77 Para Brigade’s infantry assaults to retake Zojila Pass failed in August–September 1948, Thimayya planned an audacious operation, which involved the stealthy movement of Stuart light tanks from the 7th Light Cavalry Regiment from Jammu to Srinagar in mid-October 1948. The American-built Stuart tanks were sturdy machines that were produced in large numbers during WW II and saw action with the Indian divisions in Burma. They did not have heavy armour protection like the Sherman and Centurion tanks, but had a 37mm gun along with a couple of machine guns
From Srinagar, these tanks were dismantled and transported as water carriers to Baltal, about 80 km from Srinagar. They were admirably assisted by two companies of ‘Thambi’ engineers of the Madras Engineering Group (MEG) under Major Thangaraju, who not only paved the way for the movement of the tanks from Jammu to Srinagar across weak wooden bridges, but also created tank-friendly tracks from Baltal all the way up to Zojila Pass, braving enemy fire as they laid the last few yards of the road.50From the Madras Engineering Group Archives at the Regimental Centre in Bangalore. While the track was being laid, the tank unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Rajinder Singh Sparrow acclimatized for a few days – proving the engines at high altitude before surprising the enemy in freezing conditions.
On 1 November 1948, Zojila Pass was cleared of bewildered Pakistani raiders as they were surprised by a combined arms assault by tanks and fighter aircraft over the next two weeks. Kargil and Dras would be recaptured by the Indian Army after ferocious hand-to-hand fighting.51C.B. Khanduri, Thimayya: An Amazing Life (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2006), p. 130–134. Also see S.N. Prasad and Dharam Pal, ed., Operations in Jammu and Kashmir: 1947–48 (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, Historical Division), p. 356–358. With the raiders retreating to Skardu by end-November 1948.52‘New Offensive in Kashmir. Thrust through Zojila Pass: RIAF Support for Ground Forces,’ The Hindu, 17 November 1948, p. 3. The Hindu reported that RIAF aircraft gave close support to moving columns strafing the enemy dug-in gun positions and mortar positions on mountain slopes on either side of the defile.53Ibid. Tempest fighter aircraft operating from Srinagar were guided on to their targets in the Zojila and Dras areas by Dakotas which acted innovatively as an air control team whenever the weather permitted. Though the number of sorties were few, the fighter attacks with rockets and bombs, along with strafing runs with cannons, caused significant psychological degradation of enemy morale and caused the raiders to collapse and retreat.54For a description of the Dakota-aided fighter strikes, see Air Vice Marshal A.K. Tiwary, Indian Air Force in Wars (New Delhi: Lancer, 2012), p. 64–66. The criticality of the operation can be gauged by the fact that between Kargil and Leh, a distance of almost 300 km, there was just one position manned by a platoon from the Leh garrison guarding a vital bridge at Khalatse (also called Kalsi), about 80 km from Leh. Had this bridge fallen, it would have been a clear run for the raiders to Leh.
Largely forgotten over the years has also been what could be considered as the first sustained special operations campaign by Indian commandos in the Skardu sector in September 1948. Akin to operations by the famed Long Range Penetration Groups in the Burma campaign, Major Hari Chand of the Manali–Leh trek fame and his band of carefully selected Gorkha and Ladakhi troops, carried out a series of daring raids along the Indus and Shyok Valleys. They killed a number of raiders, destroyed a large howitzer that was being transported for the attack on Leh and disrupted the long lines of communications and supply lines that the raiders, had created from Skardu during their multiple offensives on Leh, Kargil and Dras.55Also see Official History of the 1947–48 India-Pakistan Conflict (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence), p. 340–42. This had a tremendous psychological impact on the raiders and by the time they retreated along the Indus in November, they were a bedraggled and defeated force.
Further south, some of the bloodiest battles were being fought in the Naushera and Poonch sectors by two brigades (19 and 5 Brigade) of the Jammu Division (commanded by Major General Atma Singh) as they desperately attempted to force their way from the south to make the still elusive ‘Poonch Link Up’ happen. The Pakistan Army had assigned almost a brigade worth of regular troops in the sector to support the two Azad Kashmir brigades and enjoyed a slight numerical superiority over Indian forces till one more Indian brigade was pushed into action in late October 1948.56Lieutenant General E.A. Vas, Without Baggage (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 1987), p. 163–166. There was near parity in artillery and the only advantage that the Indian Army had was in terms of the quality of its troops and a squadron of tanks to push through when the road links were cleared. Systematically clearing all the heights around Poonch proved to be the hardest task, as the enemy was well entrenched and could be evicted only after a frontal assault and hand-to-hand fighting. The Battle of Topa Ridge and the simultaneous assault by 5 Brigade and the Poonch Brigade on two other vital heights on 21 November were the last battles for Poonch. Maurice Cohen, the young signals officer with 19 Brigade, writes:
Every Commanding Officer in the two brigades was summoned to a conference, to receive the last and final briefing. Brigadier Yadunath Singh standing with his feet astride facing north, pointed towards Topa Ridge, the last enemy stronghold still in our way. Raising his voice and speaking more vehemently than he had ever been known to do before, he said – ‘Gentlemen, you see those two features in front of you; they must be captured at any cost and it will be done, even if all of us have to give our lives to do so … they are the orders of our government, the Government of India – our own country. The land link will be pushed through. The population will be relieved. That is all.’57Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Cohen, Thunder over Kashmir (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1955), p. 110.
An ascetic commander with Spartan habits, Yadunath was one of the heroes of the final days of the war. On 21 November 1948, the battles were won and Yadunath met Pritham Singh on the outskirts of Poonch. The year-long siege was over! This pretty much sums up the initial saga of Poonch and to this day, 21 November is celebrated by the Poonch Brigade with much fanfare with the residents of what has now become a bustling town of nearly 3,00,000.