Chapter 11: Guns Fall Silent

[Guns Fall Silent](part0002.html#INC11)

For Pakistan, the possession of Kashmir was crucial to her ideology … To India … its integration was vital because it demonstrated that even a Muslim-majority state province could thrive within a predominantly Hindu state, thus validating the concept of a secular, democratic state.1Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistan Conflicts since 1947 (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1999), p. 37.

– SUMIT GANGULY

TAME CEASEFIRE?

As a white blanket of snow heralded the onset of winter and the bare chinar trees and walnut groves sadly watched over the war, the times did not augur well for the Indian Army as operations slowed down. Further making the going tough for both Thimayya and Atma Singh was the fact that after due clearance from the Pakistan Army C-in-C, General Frank Messervy, their divisions were now frontally engaged by a division each of the regular Pakistan Army (9 Frontier Division and 7 Pak Division).2Lieutenant General E.A. Vas, Without Baggage (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 1987), p. 111. For a review of the deployment of Pak regular forces in the autumn of 1948, see S.N. Prasad and Dharampal, ed., Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947–48, an official history sponsored by India’s Ministry of Defence (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 2005), p. 367. Much to the frustration of their aggressive brigade commanders like Harbaksh Singh and Yadunath Singh, they were ordered to wait for the spring of 1949 to build up forces for any further offensive towards Mirpur, Kotli, and Muzaffarabad and into the northern regions of J&K. This was not to be as Mountbatten pushed Nehru and the Pakistani political leadership to accept a UN-brokered ceasefire on 31 December 1948 that left large parts of the Northern Region, Kashmir Valley and Jammu province in Pakistani hands. The military angle of this nudge was that had the Indian Army supported by an increasingly confident Royal Indian Air Force chosen to conduct their spring offensive along the Indus towards Gilgit and Skardu, the strategically important region might no longer remain a buffer that could be exploited by the British in the Great Game – a possibility which they optimistically thought could be sustained for decades to come.

By August 1948, the situation had become quite precarious for Pakistan and it was at this time that Indian war correspondents reported that interrogation of regular Pakistani troops of the Punjab Regiment revealed that British officers were leading the raiders under direct command of ‘high ranking British officers’.3‘High Ranking British Officers in Enemy Lines,’ Bombay Chronicle, API report, 6 September 1948, p. 1. Also see Bombay Chronicle, 30 August 1948, p. 1. This was in direct contravention of the orders from Lord Mountbatten, which barred the participation of British officers from either side in the conflict. Concurrently, the Government of India was under tremendous pressure from Lord Mountbatten and the British C-in-Cs to limit military options and settle for international mediation under the auspices of the United Nations.

As referred to earlier, but in a different context, the situation as it prevailed in late 1948 gave Pakistan the strategic depth it needed, something that even Akbar Khan referred to in his book Raiders from Kashmir.4Major General Akbar Khan, Raiders over Kashmir (Karachi: Army Press, 1992), p. 12–16. Also see Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistan Conflicts since 1947 (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1999), 39–42. Anticipating a ceasefire by the year-end, Pakistan commenced one last attempt to push Indian forces back in two sectors of interest, Poonch–Naushera and Kargil–Dras, by mobilizing additional troops and tribals in Mirpur, Koth and Muzaffarabad.5‘Secret Military Preparations in NWFP,’ Bombay Chronicle, 3 September 1948, p. 1. In Karachi, a press communiqué called for all releases from the armed forces to be stopped and the re-enlistment of reservists.6Bombay Chronicle, 20 September 1948, p. 7. War correspondents reported the massing of two brigades of Gilgit Scouts, Chitralis and Baltis in the Skardu area and a call for jihad in the Northern Area with conscription being mooted for all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five.

This uncertainty was eminently suited to the end state that the British were looking at: impressing upon India the need to exercise restraint and not escalate the war with Pakistan on multiple fronts. The senior Indian military leadership, however, wanted to build up forces during the winter of 1948 and push for total victory even if it meant having to open another front in Punjab. They felt that they owed it to the officers and men who had laid down their lives in battle.

Pressurised by the UN to settle for a ceasefire for almost a year after it had surprisingly moved the Security Council to intervene in the conflict in early 1948, the Indian government settled for a UN-sponsored ceasefire on 1 January 1949. However, the much anticipated plebiscite in Kashmir never happened; that tale has been much narrated by distinguished political commentators across the world and will not be discussed in this chapter.7For an objective analysis of the various UN initiatives on Kashmir in 1948, see Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2010). For a perspective sympathetic to Pakistan, see Joseph Korbel, Danger over Kashmir (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). There were too many geographical preconditions that favoured Pakistan and, by not being assertive enough about retaining control over areas like the Haji Pir Pass, Gilgit and Skardu, India ceded operational advantage in the region to Pakistan. It would prove ominous in the years ahead, particularly when China started evincing keen interest in Ladakh. The Indian press by and large was accommodative and accepted the ceasefire as a fait accompli – they preferred to highlight the inability of the raiders and the Pakistan Army to press home their initial advantage, rather than question India on its inability to throw the invaders completely out of Kashmir. In an operational assessment made as early as in August 1948, the Bombay Chronicle commented:

Today the invaders are exactly where they were eight months ago. They are being held at Chakoti in the West, Tithwal in the North West beyond River Kishenganga, at Gurez in the North and Zojila Pass in the North East. Only one sixth of Kashmir is held by the enemy including Muzaffarabad, Poonch Jagir, Bhimbar and Mirpur.8‘Invaders Plan Foiled in Kashmir: No Material Gain after 10 Months Operations in the Valley,’ Bombay Chronicle, 25 August 1948, p. 7.

However, the international press seemed to buy Pakistan’s story better as the accessibility to the areas of conflict was easier from the Pakistani side. A typically biased and factually incorrect report from The New York Times by Robert Trumbull seemed to suggest that Pakistan had gained the upper hand in the conflict by capturing and occupying three-fourths of the state and dominating half the population, establishing a government and collecting taxes.9‘Misleading Reports in US Press,’ Bombay Chronicle, 1 December 1948, p. 4.

And what of the Kashmiri people and how they felt about the war raging around them? Sheikh Abdullah in a speech made on the eve of the first anniversary of India’s freedom was effusive in his praise for the sacrifice and gallantry of the Indian Army. However, the aspirations of freedom for the Kashmiri people had not vanished. He said:

The attainment of our dream of independence might have received a setback or its realization delayed owing to the grim war that had been forced upon us from Pakistan. Blood which heroic sons of India have shed on the battlefields of Kashmir in defence of the people cannot go in vain and is bound to blossom forth as a symbol of comradeship between the peoples of Kashmir and India. Let us stand by the pledge that India has given us and we have given India forever.10‘Resolve to Stand by India,’ Bombay Chronicle, 16 August 1948, p. 2.

Sheikh Abdullah was to change tack as the ceasefire was implemented by once again expressing aspirations for independence and asking for guarantees from India, Pakistan, the UK, the US and the UN.11Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2010), p. 147. Though he retracted this statement after pressure from the Indian government, this flip-flop approach was to continue for years to come as he continued to search for an elusive solution for the Kashmiri people.

EARLY LESSONS

A military historian’s favourite questions are: ‘What if?’, or ‘Why not?’ His favourite cliché invariably is: ‘In hindsight, if X, Y or Z had been done, the tide of battle would have turned.’ However, the historian has the luxury of analysing, praising and critiquing the actions of various protagonists in a conflict from the relative comfort of his research and archival environment. As long as he realizes that and remains respectful and not disdainful of decisions that were taken in the heat of battle, he is on the right track. This is one of the many traits of John Keegan, the eminent British military historian that I have tried to emulate. If Wavell had not applied his military mind and first alerted Churchill and then Prime Minister Attlee to the dangers of leaving the north-western regions of the Indian subcontinent in the hands of a Congress-led undivided India, the idea of a Pakistan may never have been encouraged by Britain’s post-war political leadership. Alive to the possibilities of Soviet expansion into Central Asia and towards the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and the petroleum-rich Persian Gulf, Wavell covertly encouraged the germination of the ‘Pakistan seed’ within Jinnah’s mind. The reason being that Pakistan would be more amenable to staying within the Commonwealth and provide bases to Britain so that it could monitor and stay in touch with Soviet expansionism and counter a possible collusive strategy between a resurgent Soviet Union and an emerging China.

That politics and religion dictated the 1947–48 conflict between India and Pakistan is beyond doubt. The fledgling Indian government of the time has often been accused of procrastinating when it came to taking critical military decisions that could have prevented the conflict from escalating and spreading across three fronts. A mere look at what was happening in the rest of the country – Partition riots, Hyderabad and much more; the hybrid British–Indian composition of military leadership; lack of military expertise within the government; and an inherent disbelief that religious differences and fundamentalist ideologies could turn comrades into enemies in a matter of months were amongst the many reasons why Nehru’s government responded as it did. What happened in Kashmir went against the grain of India’s dream of building a secular, liberal and multicultural democracy.

The mechanics of Pakistan’s proxy war and asymmetric tactics against India emerged during the 1947–48 conflict. Closer analysis of the conflict would reveal that the concept of jihad in J&K germinated in the indoctrination given to the raiders and elements of the Pakistani army in the run-up to the invasion by Akbar Khan and his band of religious zealots. That India chose to largely ignore such strategies till the proxy war waged by Pakistan assumed dangerous proportions in the early 1990s, could be a reflection of our initial conviction that idealism and secularism would overcome ‘realpolitik’ and divisive politics in India and its neighbourhood as democracy evolved in the region.

Despite his brilliant intellect and understanding of history, Nehru’s ambivalent attitude towards the military comes out clearly in his correspondence with his daughter Indira Gandhi in his book Glimpses of World History. His disdain and circumspection towards the reality of force application as an unavoidable tool of statecraft is quite surprising considering that his view of world history was shaped during his studies and early days in England. Despite his tentativeness with matters military when forced to face the grim realities of an impending war and its impact on what was dear to him (Kashmir), many of his early military decisions were spot on. Given the precarious situation at Poonch, his decision to divert a part of the buoyant 161 Brigade southwards, much to the consternation of some of his military commanders, was instrumental in saving Poonch. Similarly, his decision to overrule his British C-in-Cs and allow the use of air power, albeit with some restrictions, against the raiders within Kashmir proved to be a significant force multiplier. Critics may, however, add that it was because of these restrictions that the RIAF could not bomb the bridges at Domel and Muzaffarabad to cut off the retreating raiders.

Jinnah on the other hand was unable to overrule his British C-in-Cs and commit the Pakistani army and the much smaller Pakistan Air Force into the conflict at an early stage. This was primarily because of Jinnah’s lack of interest in matters military and the absence of adequate indigenous leadership at all levels. In an interview with Stephen Cohen, General Gracey, Pakistan’s second commander-in-chief, once remarked that Jinnah and other Pakistani politicians were ‘completely abysmally ignorant of what was going on in the military’.12Steven Wilkinson, Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015), p. 204. It was only when the situation in the Mirpur, Kotli, Domel and Muzaffarabad sectors become critical that the Pakistan 7 and 9 Divisions were committed to the operation. Similar was the case with the employment of the Pakistan Frontier Rifles in the Ladakh sector. Geography too was against the Indian Army – Abbottabad, the hub of raider activity to Chakoti from where operations were finally launched in the Uri sector, was just 40 miles from the battle front, while Pathankot to Srinagar via the Banihal Pass was 300 miles.

What if Nehru had not ordered the airlift of 1 Sikh into Srinagar at the time he did? For sure, the raiders would have ransacked Srinagar and spread out into the Valley. Reacting to this, the Indian Army would have concentrated in Jammu and advanced towards Poonch, where they would have been given a tough fight by the raiders and elements of the Pakistan Army which would have reached Poonch and the Kashmir Valley by then. The suave Mountbatten then would have stepped in and counselled Nehru on the futility of further conflict, and barring the areas around Jammu, the rest of Kashmir may have amalgamated into Pakistan. What then of Ladakh is again a big ‘if’. Could it have been defended had the Valley fallen to the raiders leaving only an axis of advance for the Indian Army from Manali and Rohtang Pass? Probably not! Would the British have allowed Ladakh to become a province of Pakistan? I would not hazard a guess as to what status would have been assigned to Ladakh.

POST-INDEPENDENCE ETHOS

The 1947–48 war with Pakistan showcased a remarkably refreshing emerging ethos of the Indian armed forces – an ethos that transcended its colonial legacy and showcased its secular, multicultural and multi-ethnic flavour. A Sikh regiment was the first to be rushed in to defend a Muslim-majority province. Lieutenant David, who charged in from the rear in his Daimler armoured car of 7 Cavalry and caused mayhem amongst the tribals at Shalateng, was a Christian. Major Maurice Cohen, the young Signals officer who took part in the various battles that were fought in the Poonch sector, was a Jew. Brigadier Usman and Squadron Leader Zafar Shah were Muslims who chose to stay in India despite direct approaches from Jinnah. Mehar Singh was a fiery Sikh; Mickey Blake, the dashing flight commander of one of the Tempest squadrons who made all those daring forays over Skardu, was among the many Anglo-Indians who were decorated for their exploits in combat; Minoo Engineer, the Officer Commanding of 1 Wing (Srinagar), was a Parsi; and best of all, the engineer regiment that built the track to Zojila in freezing temperature was a company from the Madras Engineering Regiment under the command of Major Thangaraju. Many of these ‘Thambis’ (most south Indians in the armed forces are affectionately called Thambi, which means ‘little brother’) had never seen snow in their lives! This is not to forget all the other ethnic communities who fought side by side – Kumaonis, Gorkhas, Jats, Ladakhis, Dogras, Marathas, Mahars, Rajputs, Coorgs, and many more. It truly was a spectacular show of unity in diversity. Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, a veteran of the 1971 India–Pakistan war and one of independent India’s most respected soldier-scholars, recollects that a fierce nationalistic and anti-colonial spirit had permeated the ranks of officer cadets at the Indian Military Academy in the mid-1950s. Much of it, he recollects, was inspired by the exploits of India’s armed forces in its first post-Independence conflict in Jammu and Kashmir.13Interaction with Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar at his residence on 30 July 2015.

THE LEARNING CURVE

India was militarily surprised by a smaller and focused adversary with a clear aim – sever J&K using jihad as a prop and unrestricted warfare as a tool. Though India’s military response was delayed in every sector because of distance and lack of adequate air mobility assets, its professional soldiers and airmen were better organized, better led and committed to a larger common cause, which was well communicated to them by brilliant field commanders. The raiders were poorly led in the Kashmir Valley and driven by motives other than ‘jihad’; this led to delays wherever they had the opportunities to loot and plunder the rich Kashmir countryside. However, the southern element of the raider force comprising Poonchi, Rajputana and Punjabi Muslims had more battle experience and proved more than a handful for the Indian Army. When the Pakistani army joined battle openly in mid-1948, attrition warfare with sustained artillery support became the norm. This made the going hard for Indian troops, who were hoping to make speedy gains in the Tithwal–Muzaffarabad sector where Thimayya had anticipated significant progress.

That the Pakistan Army was lacking in operational leadership too comes out clearly in an interview with B.R. Nanda in 1997 where Lord Mountbatten clearly highlighted that ‘Pakistani generals at independence were not as able as the Indians’.14Interview with Lord Mountbatten by B.R. Nanda on 26 July 1967, NMML Oral History Project. In early 1948 General Frank Messervy, the first British C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, reportedly remarked to one of his visiting friends that he had disapproved of the timid manner in which the Pakistan Army had supported the raiders: ‘All it required was a battalion in plain clothes – a battalion less two companies at Srinagar and two companies at Banihal Pass and that would have been the end of the story.’15Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 52. Messervy too had underestimated the quality of both the leadership and the fighting abilities of independent India’s armed forces. Thimayya, Atma Singh, Pritham Singh, Usman, Mehar Singh, Ranjan Dutt and Moolgavkar epitomized the ethos of ‘leading from the front’, while 1 Sikh of Srinagar fame and the ‘Thambis’ of the Madras Engineering Group demonstrated the courage and adaptability of troops from a secular India.

Many have wondered why 161 Brigade was not reinforced speedily despite its commander crying hoarse on the issue. If within a week, an entire brigade and more could be airlifted by 12 Squadron and civil Dakotas. Seeing the success of the brigade in driving the invaders back, it seems strange that another brigade was not flown in with the same urgency to drive home the advantage and sustain the momentum of advance. One suspects that the two British C-in-Cs and Mountbatten were surprised at the decisiveness of the Indian commanders and deliberately stalled any requests for reinforcements from Brigadier Sen as it could have altered the operational end state that the British had in mind.

Operationally and logistically, the numbers just did not support the battle plan and had it not been for the aggressiveness of Thimayya and his field commanders in the Srinagar and Leh sectors, India may have managed to retain even less of J&K than what they ultimately got after the rather untimely ceasefire. In the Jammu sector too, after an initial period when the raiders had a numerical advantage, the Indian Army built up forces and managed to hold a powerful combination of raiders and the Pakistan Army at bay. While the build-up of forces in J&K was slow and the command and control structure left much to be desired, the moment the two divisions (Srinagar and Jammu) were formed under Major Generals Thimayya and Atma Singh, the corps commander should have orchestrated the overall battle from Srinagar, rather than rely on directions from Western Command.16‘DEP Redesignated as Western Command,’ Bombay Chronicle, 6 November 1948, p. 1. Schooled in the Montgomery style of attrition warfare and the Slim style of pursuit warfare, Indian field commanders like Thimayya displayed a refreshing attempt to bring in manoeuvre warfare and a combined arms approach to the battlefield.

If India had not accepted the UN-brokered ceasefire, it would have built up forces methodically through the winter as Lieutenant General Cariappa had by then taken complete charge of military operations. Nehru would have seen through the fog of war and Mountbatten, who after initially sympathizing with India, had started gravitating towards Pakistan as Indian military successes through 1948 pushed Pakistan on the back foot. His assertive military commanders like Thimayya and Atma Singh would have impressed on him the need to go for the jugular and push the Pakistanis completely out of Kashmir. While this may not have been possible as the Pakistan Army would have fully joined in the fight, large tracts of territory in the Skardu region, Domel, Tithwal and Poonch areas could have been reclaimed by the Indian Army during a spring offensive in 1949, following which India might have accepted the ceasefire after getting assurances of further withdrawal from occupied territories. Importantly, Shaksgam Valley may never have been ceded to China. All senior commanders of the time felt that had India stalled the ceasefire and built up forces for a spring offensive in 1949, the map of Jammu and Kashmir would have been significantly different today. Another proverbial ‘if’ which is often discussed is that if the Pakistani politico-military establishment had chosen not to push in the tribal raiders and attempted to force a popular people’s insurrection, how long would Maharaja Hari Singh have held on to the Standstill Agreement and vacillated between his choices. Would India instead have forced the military option? A highly unlikely possibility considering the amount of pressure it would have faced from Mountbatten and British military commanders. Who knows whether a concurrent plebiscite in Hyderabad and J&K might have come about after protracted negotiations!

It was not to be as India and its people were fed up of strife and conflict, and Nehru and the Congress party were impatient to get the world’s most populous democracy on its feet. One last point that could have changed the course of the war was when Nehru lost his trust in General Rob Lockhart and asked for him to be replaced with General Bucher as the Army C-in-C in December 1947. With the conflict at a critical stage, he was well within his right to demand that an Indian general take complete charge of operations – Cariappa and a few others were reasonably placed to assume command. That Nehru did not do so was reflective of his lack of confidence and trust in his Indian officers; something that was to translate over the years into a fragile politico-military relationship.

As far as air power was concerned, Air Marshal Thomas Elmhirst, the first C-in-C of the Indian Air Force, had this to say in his typically understated and rather condescending style in one of his observations after the war:

So started a frontier war that went on for months. Sad as it was for two new nations, for the Indian Air Force it gave an immediate objective. Pilots came under fire and had to fire their guns and rockets; leadership or failure showed itself. Regrettably as it all was in principle, in fact nothing could have been better for morale and training of the new little Air Force three or four months old.17IAF Historical Cell, Air HQ.

In a collation of international analysis of one year of India’s freedom published in the venerable Bombay Chronicle, Robert Trumbull of The New York Times in a piece titled ‘First Year of Freedom – India through Western Eyes’ assessed:

Many had thought that India would be Balkanised, but it has managed to remain one nation. India resembles a crazy quilt of different patchworks stitched as one18‘First Year of Freedom: India through Western Eyes,’ Bombay Chronicle, 24 August 1948, p. 8.

The New Statesman and Nation from London reported:

Free India in one year has completely undone the archaic establishment by which their former British masters divided and ruled the empire.

Reporting on the continuing conflict in Kashmir, the London Tribune correctly assessed that the Kashmir conflict would drag on for years – maybe decades – as the stakes for both India and Pakistan were too great.

Though statistics do not always tell the actual story, their importance for the modern researcher cannot be downplayed. As per official Indian records,19S.N. Prasad (chief editor) and U.P. Thapliyal (general editor), The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History (Dehradun and Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2011), p. 379–80, an official history of the ministry of defence. the Indian Army lost a total of 1,103 soldiers killed in action including seventy-six officers, while the Jammu and Kashmir state forces, which bore the brunt of the raiders’ initial assault, lost over 1,900 men. The RIAF lost thirty-two officers and men, the bulk of them being pilots. The enemy (Pakistani army and raiders) had casualties of over 6,000 killed and many more wounded. Small as the casualties may seem as compared to the horrific loss of life during the preceding Partition and the just concluded WW II, they do not reflect the intensity of combat over almost fourteen months in hostile terrain and harsh weather. In recognition of their valour, officers and men of the Indian Army won five Param Vir Chakras, forty-seven Maha Vir Chakras and 284 Vir Chakras, while the RIAF was decorated with four Maha Vir Chakras and twenty-eight Vir Chakras.20Ibid. Maybe, Air Commodore Mehar Singh deserved the Param Vir Chakra for his sustained risk-taking against overwhelming odds in the Poonch and Leh operations.

The last lesson from this war which would have a bearing on future conflicts involving India was the fact that India as a country would always prefer restraint and caution when it came to using force as an instrument of statecraft. It would always prefer negotiations and diplomacy instead, revealing that as a nation it was more comfortable with articulating deterrence rather than pursuing coercion as a security strategy. This singularly meant that it would employ its defence forces in a primarily defensive role, thereby exposing it to significant initial attrition before offering a befitting riposte. It is to the credit of India’s military leadership that it has respected this political strategy, albeit, at times, paying a heavy human price for it. The brave words of Major Somnath Sharma – ‘I shall not withdraw an inch but will fight to the last man and the last round’ – would ring true in many battles and encounters that India’s armed forces would fight in the years ahead to protect Indian democracy and sovereignty.